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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the first professional sports league – the National League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs -- was formed in the late 19th Century, North American sports leagues have with rare 
exception adopted the same structure: owners of individual clubs in different cities individually 
undertake to run their own clubs, and jointly agree to organize an annual sporting competition 
leading to the designation of a league champion.  The imprimatur of no less than the United 
States Supreme Court has been placed on this design of a sports league.  Citing Robert Bork, the 
Court observed that the marketing of contests between competing clubs “would be completely 
ineffective if there were no rules on which the competitors agreed to create and define the 
competition to be marketed.”1  A critical aspect of the sports industry, the Court found, was that 
“horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.” 2
Actually, we do not believe this empirical assertion is correct.  An organized team sports 
competition requires some economic entity to perform “competition organizing services,” and 
then, in order to develop the competition, to acquire the services of clubs who will compete.  In 
North America the “competition organizer” is typically a joint venture of participating clubs.  
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1
 National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (hereinafter 
“NCAA”) (emphasis added) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 278 (1978) (a 
sports league is a leading example of a business activity that “can only be carried out jointly”).
2 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101.  The term “horizontal restraints” is well known in antitrust 
jurisprudence, referring to agreements between competitors, and are distinguished from “vertical 
restraints” between suppliers and a variety of firms at a different level of distribution.  See
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).
2Thus, whether the National League’s Chicago Cubs play the American League’s Boston Red Sox 
in “inter-league play” is determined by a (usually super-majority) vote of the clubs themselves.  
However, there is no inherent reason why this must be so.  Australian courts have recognized 
that leagues compete in a distinct market for “competition organizing services.” In two 
important antitrust cases, rival leagues vigorously sought to recruit entire clubs to participate in 
their own competitions, and then agreed to exclude clubs from a merged competition organized 
by a Board of Directors only partially controlled by the participating clubs.3  In the United States, 
the fastest growing sports competition exists among stock car drivers, who not only compete in 
3
 In News Ltd. v. Australian Rugby League, 139 A.L.R. 193, 338 (Full Fed. Ct. 1996), the court 
found that rugby league clubs competed for the services of two rival leagues, Superleague and 
the Australian Rugby League, as competition organizers.  An agreement among “loyal” clubs to 
collectively participate in the established ARL was found to be an unlawful collective decision to 
prevent the supply by the clubs of rugby league teams to any competition organizer other than 
the ARL, and to prevent the acquisition of competition organizing services from anyone other 
than the ARL.   Eventually, the warring parties agreed to end inter-league rivalry and create a 
newly merged competition under the direction of a Board of Directors composed of three 
directors from News Ltd. (a media corporation that owned the pay television rights) and three 
directors from the Australian Rugby League, a federated organization where clubs participating 
in the premier competition had important but not exclusive influence.  South Sydney District 
Rugby League Football Club Ltd. v. News Ltd., 181 A.L.R. 188, 195 (Full Fed. Ct. 2001), rev’d, 
[2003] HCA 45 (H.C. Aug. 13, 2003), concerned the agreement between the parties establishing 
a fourteen-team maximum for a newly merged league.  The lower court reasoned that this 
provision unlawfully excluded the plaintiff from the receipt of competition organizing services. 
Indeed, the defense did not contest this point, but rather argued that the defendants had not 
enacted the fourteen-team limit for the purpose of excluding the plaintiff, an essential finding to 
warrant per se condemnation under the Australian Trade Practices Act.  The High Court agreed 
on this point and reversed a finding of illegality, emphasizing that the plaintiff had sought to 
prove a per se violation and had not sought to prove that the merger had actually lessened 
competition.  
Indeed, the evolution of a national rugby league competition in Australia demonstrated 
the distinct functions of clubs and leagues.  The traditional competition was organized by the 
Australian Rugby League, an entity controlled by a board of directors representing clubs 
participating at the top level of competition as well as a variety of other clubs and individuals 
involved in the sport; the courts have found that clubs competed among themselves for the right 
to participate in the annual top-tier competition.  139 A.L.R. at 318 (“the clubs were not 
members of the League); id. at 338-42 (detailing competition for competition organizing 
services).
3individual races but whose success in races over the course of a season determines the winner of 
the lucrative Winston (now Nextel) Cup.  Here, the competition organizer is not a venture of 
competing drivers, but rather a separate, for-profit entity, NASCAR, controlled by the family of 
Bill France, who founded the competition.4  NASCAR, and not the participating drivers, 
determine the rules of competition and the location of premier races.  Moreover, when the 
National Basketball Association created a women’s league, they did so by explicitly giving 
majority control of the WNBA board of directors to owners and league executives who did not
operate clubs in the new competition.5
The vibrancy of these non-traditional competitions demonstrates that the typical North 
American system is not inevitable; that rules on which the competitors agreed are not essential if 
the product is to be available at all.6  Rather, the traditional model reflects a conscious decision 
to vertically integrate the “upstream” function of organizing an annual competition with the 
“downstream” function of operating clubs in that competition.  This vertical integration has 
important consequences for the efficient operation of the competition.  Antitrust decisions have 
implicitly acknowledged the different economic consequences when price, output, and 
innovation are determined jointly by competitors, and when they are instead determined by a 
single firm.  Thus, the competing pipe manufacturers found to have engaged in per se illegal 
price fixing in the landmark 1899 Addyston Pipe decision were allowed to merge into a single 
4 See Koszela v. National Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, 646 F.2d 749, 750 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(anyone wishing to participate in stock car racing must “join” NASCAR but this does not give 
right to participate in control of organization but merely to participate in its sanctioned events); 
Michael A. Cokley, In the Fast Lane to Big Bucks: The Growth of NASCAR, 8 SPORTS LAWYERS 
J. 67, 70-71 (2001).
5 See Larry Lebowitz, Leagues are Forming as ‘Single Entities’ Where Decision and Profits are 
Shared by All Owners, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 1997, at 1F.
6 Cf. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101.
4entity.7  The Supreme Court expressly noted that an agreement by rivals not to compete in each 
other’s geographic markets is illegal, even though an agreement by an upstream firm that its 
downstream affiliates would not compete might not be.8
The purpose of this Article is to critically analyze the legal and economic implications of 
the prevailing choice of sports league design and to suggest an alternative more likely to promote 
efficiency and to avoid cartel-like inefficiencies.  The Article’s central theme is that monopolies 
are often more efficient than cartels, because bargaining costs prevent rival firms – who are keen 
to pursue their own self-interest at the expense of the group’s profits or consumer appeal – from 
agreeing on efficient, welfare-enhancing strategies that even a monopolist would adopt.  When a 
club-run league does not feel competitive pressure from a  reasonable substitute (e.g. a rival 
league). Part II details our concern that bargaining costs among league members lead to 
inefficiencies in the determination of the number and location of franchises, the sale of 
broadcast, marketing, and sponsorship rights, the effective oversight of club management, the 
efficient allocation of players among teams, and an optimal balance between domestic and 
international competition.  Identifying the core function of a league as the organization of a 
competition, we explain why key decisions relating to the identity, number, and location of 
participating clubs should be made by an economic entity independent of the participating clubs.  
We argue that a vertical separation between leagues and clubs, with responsibilities assigned in 
carefully considered and well-drafted franchise agreements between the league and each club, 
7 See John Shepard Wiley Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 564 (1987) 
(citing the discussion by George Bittlingmayer, Price-Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, 5 RES. 
L. & ECON. 57, 90 (1983), of United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 
1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), and its aftermath, including the defendants’ merger into the 
United States Cast Iron and Foundry Company).
8
 United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1965) (distinguishing joint action 
by rival dealers to exclude rivals from action General Motors might take unilaterally pursuant to 
franchise agreements).  This distinction was reaffirmed in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 n.28 (1977).
5provides the best way to facilitate the efficient organization and marketing of the competition.  In 
addition, we note significant legal advantages that a vertically separate league would have in 
operating more flexibly than club-run leagues.  Part III examines how to implement the proposed 
restructuring.  First, we suggest ways in which current leagues or outside investors could take the 
initiative to create a new business entity (perhaps “NFL, Incorporated”) that, when combined 
with the remaining value of clubs as franchisees, should significantly exceed the combined 
current value of the teams in the club-run league.  Although investment bankers and outside 
investors should find it profitable to seek to purchase the assets and rights necessary to become 
the competition organizer, the same transactions costs that preclude efficiencies among club-run 
leagues may also inhibit the member clubs’ willingness to adopt a more efficient structure.  
Specifically, owners may well reject a profitable restructuring because of an inability to agree on 
how to distribute the gains.  Thus, the Part concludes with a discussion of legal theories that 
might bring about the involuntary restructuring of sports leagues along the lines discussed in this 
Article, if owners were to reject restructuring efforts without legitimate justification.  
One final point merits attention in this introduction.  We assume for purposes of this article 
that the major North American sports leagues face neither product market competition nor a 
viable entry threat sufficient to force them to avoid the inefficient practices we discuss herein.  
At the same time, we assume that each league’ insulation from rivalry is not subject to imminent 
threat from antitrust intervention.9  Thus, this Article accepts the continuing ability of leagues to 
exercise market power, but suggests ways to facilitate greater efficiencies within that context.  In 
short, we suggest that both profitability and the provision of services responsive to consumer 
9
 One of us has previously suggested that the government intervene to require a divestiture of 
monopoly sports leagues into competing entities.  Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 
73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989) [hereinafter Monopoly Sports Leagues].  We have also discussed 
ways that league power could be restrained through intervention to facilitate new club entry.  
Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition in League Sports, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 
625 [hereinafter Open Competition].
6demand would improve if sports leagues looked more like McDonald’s and less like the United 
Nations.
II. THE CASE AGAINST VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN DOMINANT SPORTS LEAGUES
A. Thinking About Sports Leagues as a Product of Upstream Competition Organizing and 
Downstream Club Participation
In this section, we adopt the approach of Australian courts and think of a sports league as 
product created by the combination of upstream “competition organizing services” and 
downstream “clubs participating in the competition.”  Upstream services are those which enable 
the competition to take place, but do not necessarily have to be provided for by the competitors 
themselves.  Most obviously, these include rules basic to the integrity of the game, and the 
means to enforce these rules and to sanction those who violate them.  The desirability of an 
independent provider of these particular services is already recognized by most North American 
club-run leagues with provisions that grant broad authority in this regard to an independent 
commissioner.10   At the other end of the spectrum, downstream services are functions that are 
best fulfilled by the individual clubs, such as organizing the team, training the players, 
organizing spectator services in the form of seating and ticketing, providing refreshments and 
other stadium amenities, and similar activities.  The focus of this Article, are the myriad 
activities that can be organized either by an independent governing body or by collective action 
among participating clubs (or even a combination of both). These services include the 
determination of the number of teams admitted to the league, the determination of player 
10 See, e.g., Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (with regard to 
enforcing the code, parties clear intent was “to endow the commissioner with all the attributes of 
a benevolent but absolute despot and all the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater 
familias”).
7contract and trading rules, stadium facility standards, the sale of broadcasting rights, the extent of 
revenue sharing, and the allocation of shared revenues.  Traditionally, these decisions are made 
in North American sports leagues by a governing body composed of a representative from each 
club, with a super-majority required for major changes or initiatives.11   In contrast, we consider 
the alternative of a vertically separate entity (“The League”) that would control many of the 
decisions in the middle category discussed above, and would also determine when these 
functions are best carried out at the club or league level.  
In this section, we seek to demonstrate that significant inefficiencies in the operation of 
club-run leagues result from the tendency of these leagues to put the interests of individual clubs 
above the interest of the league as a whole, and the substantial transaction costs that prevent 
optimal results.  Not only does this reduce the potential profits available to providers of sports 
entertainment, but – because of the lack of effective product market competition for the 
dominant sports leagues – this results in output that is reduced and unresponsive to consumer 
demand compared to that which would be provided by a sports league owned by an entity 
separate from participating clubs.
11
 Indeed, league commissioners have rarely exercised their power to act “in the best interests” 
of a sport to regulate the economic issues that could be performed by an upstream governing 
authority or by club agreement.  Thus, while the Milwaukee v. Landis case, supra, upheld the 
power of baseball’s “all-powerful” first Commissioner, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, to prevent 
the St. Louis Browns from evading existing rules designed to prevent major league teams from 
using minor league clubs as “farm teams” for player development, the clubs subsequently voted 
over Landis’ objection to permit the development of the farm system (whereby major clubs enter 
into agreements with minor league affiliates to develop players), and Landis did not try to 
overrule the clubs in that regard.  See G. EDWARD WHITE, CREATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME
290-91 (1996).  See also Chicago National League Ball Club v. Vincent, No. 92 C 4398 (N.D. 
Ill. 1992), excerpted in PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 23-25 (2d 
ed. 1998) (holding Commissioner’s broad power did not extend to alignment of clubs within 
league divisions, based on specific provisions of the league Constitution limiting power in that 
manner), decision withdrawn and vacated at request of the court, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033 
(July 23, 1992) (following settlement by parties).
8B. Economic theory of vertical integration and its application to sports leagues
Economists and lawyers have long debated the economic effect and appropriate antitrust 
treatment of vertical integration.  The issue has revolved around the Chicago-school argument 
that a monopolist would not choose to vertically integrate if this were to cause a reduction in 
output (thus reducing monopoly profit) and that therefore vertical integration can only be 
motivated by efficiency (output enhancing) motives.12   This model views the relationship 
between an upstream supplier and a downstream manufacturer as a simple principal-agent 
relationship in which efficiency requires the total surplus generated by the relationship to be 
maximized.  Maximization might be inhibited, however, (1) where both firms have market 
power, if the upstream firm dictates a linear price schedule which maximizes its own profit, 
because the downstream firm’s effort to achieve its own monopoly price will result in the price 
to consumers being higher than is optimal for profit maximizing by both parties;13 (2) if firms 
under-invest in promoting the product because of a desire to free-ride on promotional efforts of 
others;14 or (3) firms under-invest for fear that the partner firm will renegotiate wholesale prices 
to avoid repaying the sunk cost element.15  Although these problems could theoretically be dealt 
with through arms length contracting,16 the Chicago school insight was that vertical integration 
would be an equally efficient solution.  Because, in this view, the burden of monopoly cannot be 
12
 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX 226-31 (1978).  This approach and the 
competing theories discussed in text are outlined in JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION (1988), Ch. 4.
13
 This is the so-called “double marginalization” problem.  TIROLE, supra note 12, at 174-76. 
14 Id. at 185.
15 Id. at 24-25.
16
 For example, a fixed fee plus a variable charge equal to marginal cost will solve the double 
marginalization problem, id. at 176, and long term contracts can deal with hold-up.  Id. at 26-27.
9increased through vertical integration, such integration must be due to the parties recognition that 
the costs of integration are less than the costs of contracting.17
Not all economists share this sanguine view of vertical integration.  The standard fear is 
that vertical integration could be used as a means to foreclose entry into a related market, while 
maintaining vertical separation would permit non-integrated rivals to compete in upstream or 
downstream markets.18 Yet another important concern is that vertical integration -- whether 
complete or long-term via exclusive dealerships – can relax downstream competition.  For 
example, integration may relax incentives for competitive downstream firms to pressure 
upstream firms for lower prices, and for upstream firms to incite downstream rivalry.19
The concern that vertical integration will relax downstream competition seems particularly 
applicable to sports leagues.  Certainly, vertical integration into the upstream services by the 
clubs -- scheduling, marketing, and organizing the competition itself -- is a plausible way to relax 
economic competition between the teams, because it permits the clubs to agree on matters like 
exclusive territories for live gate and television rights sales, labor market restraints, and revenue 
sharing.  Indeed, economic theory supports the argument that decisions made by a club-
controlled body subject to a super-majority are unlikely to be optimal. In any partnership where 
the payoffs to decisions are shared, the marginal benefit to each partner accruing through the 
sharing arrangement is smaller than the total benefit and therefore no partner has the incentive to 
vote in ways which maximize total payoffs.20  Efficient allocation of resources requires the 
17 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 12, at 227 (a vertical merger is “merely an instance of replacing a 
market transaction with administrative direction because the latter is believed to be a more 
efficient method of coordination”). 
18 TIROLE, supra note 12, at 193-95. 
19
 Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers’ Competition, 
26 RAND J. ECON. 431, 432 (1995). 
20 See e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982); Armen 
Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information costs and economic organization, 62 AM. 
ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
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services of a “residual claimant,” a separate economic actor who has the incentive to make 
optimal decisions, pay each member of the “team” their opportunity cost, and then retain the 
surplus.21  We detail, in subpart C below, how the absence of this independent actor results in 
inefficiencies in a variety of markets in which sports leagues operate. 
Sports leagues’ unique features make this aspect of vertical integration particularly 
problematic.  In order to preserve the integrity of the competition, an actual or potential 
competition organizer possesses a unique disincentive to integrate forward into the operation of 
participating clubs.  Although antitrust decisions generally treat vertical restraints imposed by 
pressure from downstream firms more harshly,22 exclusive territories and other intra-league 
restraints are specifically tolerated in sports because of clubs’ unique inter-dependence.23  A 
league run by the teams themselves are liable to make agreements that limit the extent of 
economic competition in order to simultaneously enhance the overall quality of league play 
(acceptable under antitrust law) and limit the extent of economic competition for the sake of 
increasing profits (unacceptable under antitrust law).24  Contrary to the Supreme Court’s dicta, 
21 HOLMSTROM, supra note 20, at 327 (theorem 2).
22 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(emphasizing that vertical restraint imposed by manufacturer and not at the request of other 
dealers).  At the same time, the Court as suggested that this problem is rare.  See, e.g., Business 
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727 n.2 (1988).
23
 National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (rule of 
reason appropriate for otherwise illegal agreements among competitors because on-field rivals 
must agree on rules for sport to exist); United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp. 
319 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (interdependence of strong and weak football teams justified protections to 
preserve viability of weak teams).
24
 Tribunals around the world that have invalidated sports league restraints have acknowledged 
that some restraints were necessary but the challenged one was overly restrictive.  See, e.g., Los 
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1369 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (league oversight of franchise relocation permissible but rejection of specific 
proposed relocation found unreasonable); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 
(8th Cir. 1976) (restraints on competition for players to promote competitive balance permissible 
but existing plan overbroad); United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp. 319 (E.D. 
11
however,  it is not necessary that competitors agree on these matters;  the industry certainly can 
be structured so that these measures are determined by a vertically separate competition 
organizer, as is the case in Australia, with NASCAR, and with individual sports like golf, tennis, 
or track and field.25
Moreover, it is important to distinguish the typical vertical integration of a single upstream 
firm and a single downstream firm from an integration that effectively results in the upstream 
functions being performed by a cooperative of downstream firms.  Club-run leagues still face the 
problems of double marginalization,26 free riding, opportunistic behavior,27 and costly 
contracting that vertical integration is presumed to avoid.  Because vertical integration appears 
less likely to achieve these predicted efficiencies in the sports context, and because of the 
particular potential for vertical integration to cause a welfare-reducing relaxation in inter-club 
Pa. 1953) (restraints on competition in sale of broadcast rights permissible to protect live gate but 
not to facilitate higher returns in rights sales); Union Royale Belge des Sociétes de Football 
Association v. Bosman, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (E.C.J.) (restraint on movement of players 
throughout Europe could be subject to reasonable restraints to promote competitive balance and 
to recoup investment in players but mandatory payment of transfer fee unreasonable); Buckley v. 
Tutty, 125 C.L.R. 353 (H.C. 1971) (some restraints on competition for player services in 
Australian rugby league permissible but complete ban unreasonable); Eastham v. Newcastle 
United Football Club, [1963] 3 All E.R. 139 (Ch.) (same re English soccer).
25
 It would be alarming, to say the least, if the contestants in the Olympic 100m sprint final 
determined exactly the rules on which they would compete and how they would be monitored 
(consider doping, for instance).  
26 See supra note 13.
27
 In some contexts, a club-run league may be thought to be less likely to engage in opportunistic 
behavior vis-a-vis- the downstream clubs that control it.  However, where opportunistic behavior 
can be directed at a minority of clubs, the majority could well vote to engage in such behavior.  
Certainly, individual clubs have ample incentive to engage in such behavior vis-a-vis their league 
“partners” in a club-run league.  When one considers the likelihood that a franchise agreement 
between a vertically separate competition organizers and club/franchisees would be very 
carefully drafted to attempt to eliminate forseeable opportunistic behavior, it is difficult to 
conclude that club-run leagues offer significant advantages in this regard.
12
competition, the general Chicago School presumption that vertical integration is efficient is 
particularly unwarranted with regard to sports leagues. 
C. Comparing Club-Run and Vertically Separate Leagues
Although the foregoing economic analysis precludes an assumption that vertical 
integrations are necessarily efficient, theory cannot prove the efficiency vel non of any particular 
league’s decision to operate as a club-run league.  A comparison of the economic structure of 
club-run and vertically separate leagues, however, does demonstrate that separately-run leagues 
have the proper economic incentives to reach efficient results, while club-run leagues do not.  
Noting again our acceptance of the existence of a single dominant league in the major North 
American sports, which itself causes predictable anticompetitive effects,28 our claim is that the 
design of a traditional club-run sports league results in even greater inefficiency than would 
result from the activities of an efficient, profit-maximizing monopolist.  
We contrast club-run leagues with a new type of independent business entity (“The 
League”) that would organize a competition.  This new entity would then contract with separate 
firms (the clubs) as franchisees, granting clubs the right to participate in the competition that The 
League will organize.  Franchise agreements would set forth conditions for termination, rules of 
the game, revenue streams that would be retained by the franchisees, and revenue streams that 
would be re-allocated by The League back to franchisees (as revenue sharing or as prizes for 
competitive success).  Thus, well-drafted franchise agreements would assign to The League 
those marketing activities that can most be efficiently performed centrally, while preserving 
incentives for club innovation in any markets where such innovation is forseeable.  The League 
28 See, e.g., JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY FORT, HARD BALL: THE ABUSE OF POWER IN TEAM SPORTS 
(1999); SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, eds.) (1997); Monopoly 
Sports Leagues, supra note 9; Open Competition, supra note 9.
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would determine the number and location of franchises, subject to side payments provided for in 
the franchise agreement if necessary to protect franchisee expectations.  The League also would 
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the players’ union that would determine the 
structure under which clubs would compete for players’ services.
This part examines the incentives for club-run leagues to make efficient decisions in six 
important areas, and concludes that, in comparison with The League, collective action problems 
are likely to lead club-run leagues to adopt practices that result in a smaller “pie,” because of the 
inability of the clubs to agree on how to share the proceeds of profit-enhancing initiatives.  As a 
result, club-run monopoly leagues are likely to produce (i) fewer franchises, (ii) fewer 
opportunities for broadcasting or web-casting of their games, (iii) less effective licensing of 
merchandise, (iv) greater tolerance for inefficient front-office management, (v) a less efficient 
allocation of players among teams  (in part due to inefficient sharing of revenue that might 
promote competitive balance to enhance consumer appeal), and (vi) a greater bias in favor of 
club competition at the expense of the dynamic growth of international play that fans may prefer.  
We suggest that, in contrast, a vertically-separate structure is likely to result in a more efficient 
allocation of revenue streams between The League’s shareholders and franchisees, and re-
allocations to create incentives to improve the sport’s consumer appeal.  As a result, consumers 
will benefit from receiving an entertainment product delivered more efficiently and responsively 
to their demand, and investors should also see profits increase from these realized efficiencies.
14
1.  Optimal number and location of franchises.
Sports leagues that do not face competition from close substitutes will artificially suppress 
the number of franchises in the league.29  Club-run leagues will necessarily reduce output by 
even more than a profit-maximizing single-firm monopolist would, and will avoid locations that,
while more efficient, may hurt individual club owners’ interests.
The optimal number of clubs within a league competition depends on the revenue expected 
from additional clubs, additional costs associated with additional clubs, and any lost revenue that 
arises because of reduced demand for games involving existing clubs.30  Revenue is likely to
increase with an additional club because of the new set of fans attracted to matches and/or the 
increased attractiveness of matches to existing fans due to the involvement of the new club. 
Costs increase due to the overhead involved in supplying an additional team to the league, and 
any increase in operating costs due to an increase in the number of players hired and greater 
competition for services of players. Revenues to existing clubs may potentially fall for several 
reasons: (a) the substitution by fans of matches involving the new club for matches involving an 
existing club, (b) the total quality of the league may be diminished by the addition of a club (e.g.,
because talent become spread too thinly and the overall quality of each match declines), 31  and/or 
(c) because the number of games between popular teams is reduced by the need for these teams 
29 See Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 9, at 656; NOLL & ZIMBALIST, supra note 28, 
chapter 1.
30
 This article assumes the existence of a monopoly league facing no serious threat of entry, 
whose teams cover the geographic breadth of the relevant market.  Strategic considerations may 
cause a league to expand to forestall entry.  Operational considerations may cause a league to 
decline to expand to new geographic areas if travel costs significantly increase.
31
 We suspect that the “dilution” effect of league expansion is overstated – in market terms – by 
the general sports media.  Consumers most sensitive to perceiving the reduced quality of play 
that comes from expansion are likely to be “hard core” fans who are not likely to reduce 
significantly their patronage of their favorite sports teams, much as they might like to complain 
about it over a beer in their favorite drinking establishment.
15
to also play against expansion clubs (i.e., to make room for more games with the Tampa Bay 
Devil Rays, the New York Yankees play fewer games against the Boston Red Sox).
A profit-maximizing league will expand whenever it will be profitable to do so – i.e.,
whenever net marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost.  A club-run league, however, will not 
expand unless net average revenue exceeds marginal cost.32  Indeed, if (as is common) a super-
majority vote is required for expansion, a profitable expansion will be rejected by a club-run 
league unless the increased revenue from the new team that is shared with other owners (such as 
expansion fees, increased broadcast rights fees because of higher ratings, greater sales of 
merchandise) makes a super-majority of clubs better off.  This is because each club’s
representative votes for the amount of expansion which maximizes their own club’s profits. 
Of course, if transactions costs were zero, the members of the league would be able to 
agree a set of side payments which ensures efficient expansion.  However, where transactions 
costs are not zero, then efficient contracting may well not occur.33  Clubs in North American 
sports leagues all share revenues from collective sales of television rights and licensing; each 
club’s analysis of whether to vote for expansion will also consider the club’s reduced share of 
these revenues.  Club-run leagues are also likely to under-expand as part of explicit or implicit 
agreements to protect local markets from competition.  Many suggest, for example, that Major 
League Baseball’s refusal to expand to the Washington, DC area is due to vigorous opposition 
from the Baltimore Orioles.34
32
 For a mathematical demonstration, see Open Competition, supra note 9, at 630-31 n.21.  
There is a close analogy between a sports league and a labor-managed firm that will choose to 
produce less output than a profit maximizing firm.  Benjamin Ward, The Firm in Illyria: Market 
Syndicalism, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 566 (1958). 
33 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 85, 111-12 (3d ed. 2000).
34
 Mark Asher, Expos' Relocation In 2004 Is '50-50', WASH. POST, April 16, 2003, at D7.  A jury 
similarly found that the National Football League had blocked the relocation of the Oakland 
Raiders to Los Angeles principally to protect the incumbent Los Angeles Rams from 
competition.  Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 
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In contrast, The League has the incentive to draw up franchise agreements that preserve the 
flexibility to add or relocate teams when the trade-off is favorable.  We would expect that, like 
any other franchisor, The League would determine the number and location of franchises 
authorized to participate in the competition.  In light of the dynamic nature of demand for a 
sport, we predict that The League will follow the now-typical franchisor practice of granting 
non-perpetual franchises, with specified terms for non-renewal,35and will not guarantee 
geographic exclusivity but will provide in its franchise agreement some mechanism for 
flexibility in this regard.36
1381 (9th Cir. 1984).  Side payments can compensate clubs in some cases, but difficulty in 
agreeing on the size of the payment can preclude welfare-enhancing expansions.
35 See Andrew A. Caffey, Stuart Hershman, and Lewis G. Rudnick, Structuring the Franchise 
Relationship in FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden, eds.) 
47, 61 (1997).
In the food service industry, it appears that newer companies may grant greater protection 
for franchisees than well established firms.  For example, neither Taco Bell nor Subway’s grants 
any exclusive territories, while the newer Jimmy John’s firm states that it “usually” will not grant 
competing franchises and allows franchisees to purchase “development territories.”  See 
http://www.worldfranchising.com/Top50/Food/ .  Unlike food service, of course, preserving the integrity 
of on-field competition would not allow the NFL, for example, the flexibility to give the Chicago 
Bears the right to own a second franchise in Chicago if market circumstances warranted.
36
 For truly national leagues unconcerned by the threat of entry, our prior research suggests that 
overall consumer appeal would be maximized by the creation of a multi-tiered competition, with 
entry into the major league the result of promotion from a lower tier and league size maintained 
by the relegation of unsuccessful clubs into lower-tiered competition.  See Open Competition, 
supra note 9.  Thus for example, in the English Premier League, the three worst performing 
teams are relegated to the Football League Division One and replaced by the three best 
performing teams from that division.  For the history of how this system came into being, see 
SIMON INGLIS, ENGLISH LEAGUE FOOTBALL AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT  27, 30, 40-44, 47 
(1988).   This system has several desirable incentive properties.  Because teams out of contention 
for the title still have an incentive to compete until the end of the season, this results in more 
exciting matches and desirable properties in relation to marketing the league.  Since every city 
can aspire to have a team playing at the highest level of competition one day, the league has the 
potential to maintain local interest even in markets that do not currently have a team playing at 
that level.  For analysis of the details of promotion and relegation, see Open Competition, supra
note 9; Roger Noll, The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues: The Case of 
English Football,” 3 J. SPORTS ECON. 169 (2002); Stefan Szymanski & Tommaso Valletti, 
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To illustrate, suppose that reliable market research were to demonstrate that overall 
baseball profits would increase if the Montreal Expos were relocated to the Washington, DC area 
and two expansion teams were added in suburban New Jersey and Connecticut:37 that is, the sum 
of increased revenues from expansion fees, live gate and stadium related sources at these three 
new locations, and marginally increased revenues from broadcasting and increased licensing and 
merchandise, exceeds lost revenue from Montreal-based sources, marginally lost revenue from 
the New York and Baltimore teams in close proximity, and increased costs of operating two new 
teams.  The League would be expected to proceed with the expansion after compensating 
existing clubs for losses pursuant to carefully drafted provisions of the franchise agreement.  
However, under current rules the rest of the clubs would not agree unless the expansion fees 
exceeded the reduction in their pro-rata proportion of shared revenues from 3.333% to 3.125%, 
and the New York Mets and Yankees and Baltimore Orioles could plausibly lobby a significant 
minority of owners to block the expansion out of fear that future expansion or relocation might 
be adverse to their interests.  
Promotion and relegation in sporting contests (Imperial College Working Paper 2003), available 
at http://www.ms.ic.ac.uk/tommaso/recent.htm. 
The League might alternatively find it more profitable to continue the North American 
practice of reaping significant monopoly profits by demanding public subsidies for stadia, which 
could be recovered by The League in the form of an entry fee.  For sports that seek geographic 
expansion, The League may deliberately seek out, subsidize, and make medium-term guarantees 
of competition participation for franchisees located in under-developed areas.  If The League 
fears potential entry, it may wish to ensure a number and location of franchises that deters new 
rivals.  Thus, for example, the National Hockey League may act strategically to assure franchises 
located in the American sunbelt (in order to develop the sport and national television ratings 
there) and in Canadian cities (to forestall the creation of a rival league in the sport’s founding 
country). 
37
 Although this assumption is purely illustrative, we note that this would give the New York 
metropolitan area four of 32 major league teams.  In the English Premier League, by contrast, 
where market forces determine entry into the top-tier league (because good teams are promoted 
from lower tiers and bad teams are relegated), between five and six London-based clubs 
regularly participate in the 20-team elite competition.
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2. Sale of Broadcast Rights
Club-run leagues also have a disincentive to maximize profits from the sale of broadcast 
and internet rights, because of difficulties in reaching agreement on how to share revenues 
available from expanded output in the sale of these rights.  In the English Premier League, for 
example, rights have traditionally been sold collectively.   In reviewing a government challenge 
to an agreement to sell television rights for only sixty of 380 possible games, the Restrictive 
Practices Court found that the league’s limitation on television sales actually reduced revenues.38
However, the clubs could not agree on how to share revenue gained from additional sales, 
whether negotiated individually or collectively.39 Unlike English soccer, television rights to 
games not collectively sold by the NBA may be sold within a team’s assigned territory by each 
club.  However, the NBA sought to prevent the then-popular Chicago Bulls, featuring superstar 
Michael Jordan, from carrying their games on a leading Chicago free-to-air channel (WGN) that 
was shown outside of Chicago as a “superstation” by cable and satellite distributors, although the 
trial court found no evidence of substantial injury to the ratings or value of rights sales 
elsewhere.40  Although the league could permit the Bulls games to be shown but tax excess 
profits,41 but the league was unable to agree on a mechanism for doing so.   
38
 In re Football Ass'n Premier League Ltd., 1996 No. 1 (E&W) (Restrictive Practices Court, 28 
July 1999), ¶313 (noting that Sky Sports, the holder of the rights to broadcast 60 matches per 
season, had manifested a willingness to purchase 90 matches, but was turned down).
39
 Stefan Szymanski & Stephen F. Ross, Necessary Restraints and Inefficient Monopoly Sports 
Leagues, 1 INT’L SPORTS L. REV. 27 (2000).
40
 Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass’n, 874 F.Supp. 844, 861 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).  Subsequently, 
research has suggested that superstation telecasts might interfere with local or national baseball 
broadcasts.  See, e.g., Richard Sandomir, Just How Super Are These Stations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
1, 1992, at B13 (Neilsen ratings dropped 30% for Cardinal games broadcast in St. Louis on same 
night as Cubs games broadcast on WGN superstation and 20% for games broadcast on same 
night as Braves games on WTBS, while ESPN ratings were 69% higher when not competing 
against any other games).  One could argue, however, that baseball is unique in this regard; 
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Like other potential revenue streams, broadcast rights could be retained by The League, 
sold by each club, or divided among The League and its clubs.  The League can be expected to 
make this assignment in a manner designed to maximize league-wide revenue.   Revenue streams 
that are either global in scope or entail significant externalities between the clubs should be 
controlled by The League.  While national broadcast contracts clearly fall in the latter category, 
local broadcast rights are less clear cut.  If we were to assume that each club operated in 
completely independent broadcast markets, then it would make sense to leave these rights in the 
hands of the clubs.  But this assumption is no longer true, if it ever was.42   Rights for games not 
broadcast pursuant to national contracts, which traditionally have been sold by individual clubs, 
involve significant externalities.  Because different packages of rights can be sold at different 
prices (enabling the league to price discriminate between different buyers), The League would 
have little incentive to reduce output.  At the same time, allocating all broadcast revenues to The 
League removes the significant collective action problems that exist where clubs sell rights for 
revenues that are in part attributable to individual team effort and in part due to The League’s 
overall appeal, or where the rights sold by one club could affect the rights sold by another club to 
varying and uncertain amounts; these issues are now internalized.43  Assigning this revenue 
compared to baseball's 162 game schedule, basketball's quicker pace and 82 game schedule 
leaves less likelihood for burn-out of the average sports fan.   Jason S. Oletsky, Note, The 
Superstation Controversy: Has the NBA Slam Dunked the Superstations?, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & 
SPORTS L. REV. 173, 193 n.134 (1993).
41
 Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass’n,  961 F. 2d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
42
 During the 1950s, National Football League teams routinely packaged the television rights to 
their home games for sale in many markets beyond their local metropolitan area.  See United 
States v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
43
 The Chicago Bulls litigation, supra note 40-41, which produced numerous trial court opinions 
and two opinions from the court of appeals, can perhaps be explained by the significant 
discrepancy between the NBA’s position that the Bulls’ superstation telecasts significantly 
affected other rights sales and evidence put forth by the Bulls that it did not.  
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stream to The League also avoids the potential that the competition could be distorted because of 
revenue disparities between clubs based not on performance but the size of the media market in 
which the clubs play.44 Currently, most clubs sell local rights to two or three programmers, so 
the need to identify the best local broadcaster is not a task that The League’s officials will find 
difficult (and, indeed, since the vast majority of local cable rights in the United States are 
currently purchased by a handful of companies,45 there may be efficiencies in a single 
negotiation).46
3. Licensing, Merchandise and Sponsorships
The design and licensing of professional sports merchandise would appear to include some 
functions most efficiently done on a league-wide basis and others best done by individual clubs.  
There are obvious economies of scale in granting licenses for a particular item to one or a few 
manufacturers.  At the same time, merchandise design and local promotion would also appear to 
be essential in maximizing a product’s appeal.  Economists suggest that decision making in this 
44
 The League can address any marginal diminution in club incentives to succeed, because of the 
inability to recoup quality investments through higher fees for local broadcast rights, through the 
prize mechanism we discuss at text accompanying notes 65-66 infra.
45
 As of 2002, Fox Sports Net had 18 owned or affiliated regional sports networks, Comcast 
Sports Net ran services in the Philadelphia and Washington/Baltimore markets, and Cablevision 
Systems Corp. or its Rainbow Sports subsidiaries controlled the Fox Sports Bay Area, Chicago, 
Florida, Ohio and New England services, Madison Square Garden Network (once itself a team-
owned channel) and Fox Sports Net New York.  R. Thomas Umstead, Going to the Net Isn't 
Always Easy; Sports Teams' Start-Up Cable Channels Face Hurdles, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, 
April 29, 2002, at 36.
46
 In contrast, there may be marketing efficiencies in allowing clubs to sell radio rights for play-
by-play of their games, building a network with a flagship local station and various other stations 
in smaller towns where demand warrants.
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context should be left to those who have the best information.47 Thus, one would expect that an 
efficient league would divide merchandising responsibility and income, “selling” those parts of 
the merchandising activities that the teams understand best back to them.  Yet, virtually all 
licensing in North America, is done centrally, despite complaints by individual clubs.  At the 
other extreme, clubs in the English Premier League offer little cooperative licensing of 
merchandise.48 Revenue sharing could address any problems with individual club promotional 
activities that might free-ride on league promotion efforts or distort competitive balance, 
assuming that clubs could agree on the appropriate sharing formula.  The inability to do so has 
led to disputes and litigation in the United States,49 and the lack of any central licensing in 
England.  Thus, while collective action problems on both sides of the Atlantic seem to explain 
the unwillingness of club run sports leagues to achieve an optimal balance of cooperation and 
local promotion, The League could simultaneously assign revenue streams to create optimal 
incentives for efficient local marketing, while devising revenue sharing schemes that promote 
competitive balance or other goals.50
47 See, e.g., Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of 
lateral and vertical integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). 
48
 For example, the league website, www.premierleague.com, features a “Shop” page that simply 
provides links to each club’s “team shop.”  In contrast, www.mlb.com directs the consumer to a 
fully-integrated website where each club’s products are available. 
49
 For example, the New York Yankees were anxious to enter into a lucrative shoe contract 
while Major League Baseball was taking years to collectively sell this sponsorship opportunity. 
The lawsuit is described in Joshua Hamilton, Comment, Congress in Relief: the Economic 
Importance of Revoking Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1223, 1235 
(1998).
50 See text accompanying notes 65-66 infra.
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4. Accountability of Club Executives
Profit-maximization at the club level requires a great deal of business acumen in varied 
tasks.  The owner must assemble a staff capable of effectively dealing with stadium utilization 
issues (including construction and/or rental of facilities and management and marketing of 
luxury suites), with marketing and promotion of local live gate, local broadcast rights, and 
sponsorships, not to mention the organization of on-field playing talent.  Incentives to insure that 
management decisions are achieving the most efficient results are reduced because North 
American club owners tend to be either entrepreneurs with independent wealth or corporations 
investing in clubs to pursue strategic advantages with affiliated businesses.51  However, because 
each club’s success is tied to some degree to the success of fellow owners, one might expect 
procedures that hold each owner accountable for the stewardship of her franchise.  In a true 
franchise relationship that would exist between The League and club franchisees, we would not 
expect The League to grant a perpetual franchise, and the agreement will probably specify 
standards that franchisees must achieve.52  However, in a club-run league, the club owners rarely 
hold a fellow owner accountable for the poor stewardship of a club.53
51 See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN (2003), ch. 4.
52 See Caffey, Hershaman and Rudnick, supra note 35, at 47, 61.  See also Al Bishop Agency, 
Inc. v. Lithonia, 474 F. Supp. 828, 833-34 (E.D. Wisc. 1979) (even under Wisconsin statute 
protecting franchisees from termination except for good cause based on “essential and reasonable 
requirements,” failure to meet goals in terms of sales was grounds for termination). 
53 Nor is it likely that The League (or its shareholders) will be content to allow revenues to 
suffer because of chronically poor stewardship of any of The League’s valuable franchises.  
Currently, club run leagues tolerate persistent mismanagement of franchises such as the 
Cincinnati Bengals (NFL) and Los Angeles Clippers (NBA).  Even when a commissioner tries to 
get an under-performing owner to sell, the result can be complicated litigation on peripheral 
issues.  Accountability would significantly increase if a clearly drafted franchise agreement set 
forth minimum goals for a club.  For a suggestion that owners whose clubs fail to make the post-
season for six consecutive years lose their franchise absent a persuasive plan for corrective 
action, see Stephen F. Ross, Light, Less-Filling, It’s Blue-Ribbon!, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1675, 
1701-03 (2002).
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5. Competition for Players
All four major North American sports leagues face well-organized players’ unions.  Thus, 
the goal of a well-run league should be to minimize labor costs consistent with an efficient 
allocation of players among teams.  This goal is hampered, however, by the requirement that the 
league’s negotiating team secure approval of a super-majority of clubs to ratify any collective 
bargaining agreement.  Collective action problems inhibit efficient cost minimization in two 
discrete ways.  First, different clubs have different incentives in any labor negotiation: the 
importance of minimizing labor costs, the cost effect of particular labor restraints, and the harm 
caused by a strike or a lockout varies widely from team to team.  Thus, private and collective 
interests often conflict.  The inability of club-controlled management negotiators to present a 
united front may make it easier for union leaders to assume that management will not remain 
firm; in other cases, the union’s perception that it the needs to create a sufficiently credible threat 
of disruption to persuade the most militant one-third plus one of the clubs to reach a compromise 
may result in miscalculations that also lead to inefficient labor disruptions.  Second, creative 
labor negotiations often involve reasonable compromises or win-win solutions that may be 
demonstrably in the interest of a majority of the players and the league as a whole.  Current 
structures allow a minority of clubs, however, to block such solutions.
Economists and judges have long accepted that labor relations in sports raise unique issues 
because, unlike other industries, a competitive balance among clubs in a league makes the 
product more attractive.54  The different markets in which clubs operate, and the tendency for 
successful teams to generate more income, suggests that a completely unrestrained labor market 
will result in reduced consumer appeal.55 Devising schemes to directly or indirectly restrain the 
54 See, e.g., United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Walter 
C. Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sport, 78 Q. J. ECON. 1 (1964).
55 See, e.g., PAUL WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 189 (2000) (noting the “externality” 
that all other clubs suffer if dominant team signs star); Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 9, 
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labor market to obtain a more balanced competition is a complex endeavor.  Complete revenue 
sharing, for example, will provide balance but will reduce incentives for clubs to invest in talent; 
schemes can also result in too much balance, resulting in reduced consumer appeal because of 
the different revenue potential in different markets (thus, overall appeal may be higher if New 
York and Kansas City do not win an exactly equal percentage of the time) and because of 
consumer interest in dynasties.  However, even if balancing schemes are welfare-enhancing, they 
are unlikely to be adopted by wealthier clubs.56  Given super-majority requirements, this means 
that club-run leagues are likely to reject some profit-maximizing, welfare-enhancing proposals 
because they make a significant minority of clubs worse off.  This is further complicated because 
revenue sharing formulae are often adopted in the context of collective bargaining.57  To achieve 
the various political trade-offs necessary to win super-majority club approval can result in 
bizarre schemes.  For example, the current Major League Baseball revenue sharing agreement, 
although assertedly designed to promote competitive balance, focuses on actual revenue earned 
by clubs rather than potential revenue from their local markets, with perverse results.  For 
example, the Kansas City Royals will receive over $18 million from the league as part of new 
revenue sharing.  If they wisely invest $10 million in increased payroll because the resulting 
improvement in team quality produced $12 million in additional revenue to the club, revenue 
sharing transfers would be reduced by $9 million, resulting in a net loss to the club of over $3 
million.58
at 687-88 (same).  But cf. Stefan Szymanski, The Economic Design of Sporting Contests, 56 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1137 (2003) (literature review finds mixed support for hypothesis that promoting 
contest or seasonal uncertainty – i.e. competitive balance – increases popularity).
56 See Stefan Szymanski & Tommaso M. Valetti, Promotion and Relegation in Sporting 
Contests (Imperial College working paper), currently available at
http://www.ms.ic.ac.uk/tommaso/recent.htm.
57
 The labor law aspects of this issue are discussed in note 98, infra.
58
 This is illustrated in ZIMBALIST, supra note 51, at 103-07.
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In contrast, The League is free to make its best deal with the players’ union, without the 
additional need to ensure that the agreement makes a super-majority of clubs better off.  In 
regard to changing the incentives clubs may have to compete in the labor market, The League 
can provide for pro-rata, prize, or strategically targeted revenue transfers to permit clubs to 
operate effectively.  Revenue redistribution can, for example, enhance consumer appeal through 
improved competitive balance and by increasing club incentives to improve performance within 
the competition.59  Indeed, analysis of “economic contests” reveals that The League’s appeal can 
be significantly enhanced by the incentive-altering distribution back to the clubs of substantial 
revenues retained by The League. 
A sports league fits naturally into models of economic contests.60  Teams contribute 
effort/investment in talent toward winning a prize (the league championship). The contest model 
also makes clear the distinction this Article highlights between the function of contest organizer 
(who designs the competition and specifies the prize) and the contestants. While this vertical 
separation is clear in individual sports such as golf and tennis, it has been obscured in team 
59
 Where The League is designed for goals other that profit maximization, The League may also 
seek to redistribute revenue to beneficiaries other than clubs, such as sport development 
programs now undertaken by various international and European soccer federations, the 
International Cricket Council, and the International Rugby Board.  Balancing these interests with 
those of the major league competition that The League organizes is a topic beyond the scope of 
this Article.
60
 The original notion of an economic contest was developed in Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent 
Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF RENT SEEKING SOCIETY 97 (James Buchanan, Robert Tollison 
and Gordon Tullock, eds. 1980) (suggesting that competition for political favors could be 
characterized as rent-seeking contests, where different lobbyists invest (e.g. time, effort, bribes) 
in winning a prize (e.g. the location of a new public facility such as a military base)).  This model 
has since been applied to a number of contexts, including labor market tournaments (contests 
between workers for promotion), see Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, Rank Order 
Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981); patent races (R&D 
spending aimed at a monopoly rent granted by the patent), see Glenn Loury, Market structure 
and innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 385 (1979); and competition for research contracts, see Curtis 
Taylor, Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments, 85 AM. ECON. REV.
873 (1995). 
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sports, however, by the focus of economic analysts on treating sports leagues either as cartels,61
single entities,62 or joint ventures.63  Moreover, this obfuscation has been increased by the focus 
of analysts (and owners) on the issue of competitive balance and the need to adopt redistributive 
measures. 
Thus the conventional argument is that (i) fans value uncertainty of outcome, (ii) 
uncertainty is maximized when the quality of team players on either side is roughly equal, and 
(iii) that redistribution of resources can produce a roughly equal balance. Each of these 
propositions is open to empirical question,64 but more importantly this approach has misled many 
into thinking that a balanced outcome will be produced by taxing the rich and giving to the poor. 
Whatever the ethical attractions of such a policy, it is not one best calculated to equalize efforts. 
Rather, handouts to poor team owners will simply make those poor team owners richer without 
necessarily increasing investment in success on the field.  The critical insight of contest theory is 
that equality of outcomes will be promoted if every contestant has an equal probability of 
winning the prize for a given level of effort (equality of opportunity).  To optimize the 
investment, then, requires careful selection of the prize.
In our model, The League will select a prize structure in order to maximize the incentives 
for clubs to succeed, subject to the constraint that teams are not driven into bankruptcy. The 
problem is to try to induce a level of effort equal to the aggregate return, measured by the prize 
61
 Rodney Fort and James Quirk, Cross Subsidization, Incentives and Outcomes in Professional 
Team Sports Leagues, 33 J. ECON. LIT. 1265 (1995).
62 See, e.g., Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: the Use and Abuse of Section 
1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 219 (1984).
63
 Michael Flynn and Richard Gilbert, An Analysis of Professional Sports Leagues as Joint 
Ventures, 111 ECON. J. F27 (2001).
64
 For a survey of the evidence, see Szymanski, supra note 55.
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and any locally retained revenues for the league.65  The more the prize dominates the income 
stream of the teams, the more balanced the outcome of the contest is likely to be. The prize thus 
can correct for club dependence on local revenues, with their inevitable asymmetry, and the 
perceived unfairness that arises when asymmetric local revenue bases create asymmetric 
outcomes.
66
  If the only reward were a prize, every contestant would have an equal incentive to 
win. (Thus, if all revenues were shared and the World Series champion received a $40 million 
prize, New York teams would have no advantage over clubs from Pittsburgh or Kansas City.)  
This need not imply that The League should aim to achieve a perfectly balanced contest. Such a 
result would only be optimal if fans in each franchise location would derive an equal amount of 
utility for a given level of success.  Thus, a scheme would be welfare enhancing if clubs with a 
larger fan base, or where fans respond to wins by greater attendance won disproportionately.
Some mix of local revenue and prize money seems to be the likely means by which The League 
65 See Tullock, supra note 60.  The optimal contribution to effort depends on the "discriminatory 
power" of the contest: the degree of sensitivity of success to effort. If discriminatory power is 
high, it means that if one contestant supplies only a small amount of effort more than the others, 
then that contestant is highly likely to win; if discriminatory power is low, then a contestant has 
to put much more effort in than anyone else in order to achieve a high probability of winning.  If 
discriminatory power is high then the optimal prize may be quite small, since even this small 
prize will elicit enormous effort to win. By contrast, if discriminatory power is low, then the 
prize will need to be quite high in order to extract effort.
66
 A classic argument in this vein is RICHARD C. LEVIN, GEORGE J. MITCHELL, PAUL A. 
VOLCKER, & GEORGE F. WILL, THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE 
COMMISSIONER’S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON BASEBALL ECONOMICS (July 2000) [hereinafter “BLUE 
RIBBON REPORT”] available at http://www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blue_ribbon.pdf, which attributes 
baseball’s woes to an increasing disparity in local revenues among clubs, which the Report 
blames for an increasing inability of well-run “small market” clubs to have a “regularly recurring 
reasonable hope of reaching post-season play.”  Id. at 8.  The effect of asymmetric local revenue 
bases on local revenue should not be overstated, however.  Using the Report’s data, among the 
top six clubs are teams located in the relatively small markets of Atlanta, Denver, and Phoenix, 
while Detroit and Montreal are in the bottom quartile; indeed, if half the population size for each 
club in metropolitan areas with two clubs are assigned to each team, the statistical correlation 
between media market rank and local revenue based on Report data is a modest .58.  Ross, supra
note 53, at 1685-86 & n.38.
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will profit through maximizing fan utility across all franchises, at least to the extent that the 
league revenues increase with greater fan utility.
In practice, it seems highly unlikely that a league entirely controlled by its member teams 
will voluntarily adopt a policy of maximizing the incentive to win by establishing a reward 
structure that favors winners over losers.67  Clubs that control the competition aim to minimize 
aggregate effort, which means minimizing the economic reward for winning.  The reverse order 
of finish draft rule reverses the conventional contest incentive by awarding the biggest prize (first 
draft pick) to the loser, with predictable consequences for effort contributions.68
With regard to direct labor market restraints, we suspect that the task of precisely 
pinpointing the optimal allocation of players among clubs over a decent interval of time is 
beyond human capability.  The exercise requires not only a complex balancing of the elasticity of 
demand for wins of each club in the short term and the long term, but also a prediction of the 
effect of each player’s prior performance on that elasticity, the effect of non-performance 
variables (stadium quality, marketing), and a precise prediction of the effect of player acquisition 
on club performance.  We suggest, however, that as a general rule the most efficient means of 
allocating labor, as with other inputs, is the marketplace.  We would therefore expect The League 
to establish some rules specifically tailored to promote competitive balance,69devise a revenue 
67
 As Rosen and Sanderson observe, "All schemes used in the United States [major leagues] 
punish excellence in one way or another.”  Sherwin Rosen and Allen Sanderson, Labor Markets
in Professional Sports, 111 ECON. J. 469, F47-F68 (2001).
68
 Beck Taylor and Justin Trogdon, Losing to win: Tournament incentives in the National 
Basketball Association, 20 J. LABOR ECON.1 (2002).
69
 Examples of rules tailored to promote competitive balance would include roster limits with 
waiver rules: to prevent the best clubs from stockpiling players, each club would be limited to a 
certain number of players, with surplus players being subject to claim by other teams and with 
inferior teams having priority claims.
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redistribution policy to permit give any well-run club a “regularly recurring reasonable hope of 
reaching post-season play,”70 and otherwise allow the market to work.  
Club-run leagues have not been very successful in achieving the desired trade-off between 
cost minimization and maximizing flexibility in efficiently allocating players among teams.  
Currently, club owners in Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the 
National Hockey League complain mightily about the high cost of players, particularly veteran 
“free agents” who attract huge sums in inter-club competition when their contracts expire.  In a 
misguided effort to lower payroll, clubs insist in collective bargaining on limiting the number of 
players able to receive competitive bids for their services.71  Older players, seeking job security, 
not only attract high salaries but long-term contracts where these salaries are guaranteed for a 
number of years.  A significant reason why clubs are willing to meet older players’ demands is 
that in any particular off-season, the number of free agents is so restricted by owner-sought rules 
that many clubs in need of key talent chase very few players.72
70
 This phrase as a workable definition of the sort of competitive balance than enhances 
consumer appeal comes from BLUE RIBBON REPORT, supra note 66, at 8.
71
 Under the Major League Baseball collective bargaining agreement, only players with more 
than six years of major league service can receive competitive bids for their services.  RODNEY 
D. FORT, SPORTS ECONOMICS 283 (2003).  Under the National Hockey League collective 
bargaining agreement, only players who are older than 32 and have four years of major league 
services can receive open and competitive bids for their services; under a complicated formula, 
other players can receive bids from clubs other than their current employer, subject to provision 
that give their current employer rights of first refusal and/or compensation from the signing 
team.  Id. at 293.  Free agency is more permissive in the NFL and the NBA, but competitive bids 
are restricted, especially in the NBA, because of salary caps on each term’s payroll.  Salary caps 
are considered infra.
72
 The model for the modern paradigm of labor relations was established in the initial collective 
bargaining agreement between the Major League Baseball Players Association and the owners 
following an arbitration order that would have allowed almost all players to negotiate freely with 
any team.  Although owners who had traditionally had perpetual exclusive rights to negotiate 
with players reflexively sought to limit the number of players free to seek competing bids, the 
players’ union chief recognized that there was an “optimal mix of supply and demand” to 
maximize player salaries, which he predicted was based on requiring between four and six years 
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Without the need to secure approval of a super-majority of clubs, The League will have
greater freedom to find terms agreeable to the union that would facilitate a more flexible labor 
market.73  We think it unlikely that The League would establish across-the-board salary caps, for 
several reasons.  These caps reduce consumer appeal to the extent that they prohibit inferior 
clubs from quickly improving by increasing payroll through the infusion of new talent.74  With 
optimal revenue sharing and substantial prizes for competitive success, the revenue disparities 
between clubs will be minimized and the need to cap payrolls of “large market” teams will be 
significantly reduced.75  The League might well consider more tailored payroll limits, such as 
rules preventing the very best teams from further increasing a high payroll,76 or rules that limit 
of service.  This system was agreed to.  See MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME 
266-67 (1991). 
73
 The League may prefer to induce players’ unions to agree to a more flexible approach, similar 
to the model of European soccer, where players rarely become “free agents” but are constantly 
renegotiating long-term contracts that are assigned to other clubs for substantial sums if the 
current employer is unlikely to be able to pay the salary the player demands.  To minimize costs, 
The League might negotiate a fixed percentage of these transfer fees that will be retained by the 
player.  In addition, the league might offer concessions on other issues to induce the union to 
agree that a maximum percentage of each contract would be guaranteed.  One of the key features 
that promotes competitive balance in the National Football League is the fact that most contracts 
are structured with a substantial “signing bonus” that the player receives as guaranteed money, 
with the remaining salary subject to non-payment if the player is released.  This allows clubs 
with high payrolls and low performance to improve by releasing under-performing players.
74
 Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust 
Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 519, 567-77 [hereinafter Misunderstood Alliance].
75
 Baseball’s Blue Ribbon Report concluded that competitive balance flourished in baseball 
without any salary caps as long as the revenue differential between the top and bottom quartile 
approximated 2:1.  When the gap approached 3:1 in the late 1990s, the Report found reduced 
balance.  BLUE RIBBON REPORT, supra note 66, at 6-7.
76
 One example of this type of scheme is the so-called “Rooney Rule,” came into play for only 
the first year of the NFL collective bargaining agreement signed in 1994.  Under this rule, the top 
eight teams are limited in their ability to sign a greater number of veteran free agents than they 
lost from their own roster.  See White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1413 (D. 
Minn. 1993).
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team spending to prevent profligate expenditures that threatened club solvency.  Significantly, 
The League can control expenditures through the prize: if teams are trying too hard (insolvency), 
The League would reduce the prize fund or change the prize spread so that the benefits to 
winning are reduced, while using revenue sharing or a handicapped prize to deal with market 
asymmetries.77
Club-run leagues are largely focused on providing “cost certainty” to their member-owners, 
who may well prefer certainty about profits as much if not more than maximizing profits.78
Although a fledgling or flailing league that requires additional incentives to attract investors to 
operate clubs may find cost certainty to be a legitimate priority,79 The League’s incentives will be 
to devise a labor market structure to maximize consumer appeal, and therefore revenues.  
Certainly, The League will have no particular desire to grant “cost certainty” to club owners 
seeking to evade their responsibility to increase spending because of their club’s poor record in 
prior seasons. 
77
 However, because large revenue teams often have fan bases with a high demand for winning, 
caution is warranted to avoid going too far in eliminating asymmetry. 
78
 NHL executives have claimed that cost certainty is the overriding priority in upcoming 
collective bargaining negotiations with players.  See Andy Bernstein, NHL locks in on 
controlling player costs: Linking payrolls to revenue is league’s priority in labor plan, SPORTS 
BUS. J., Sep. 15, 2003, at 1, 18.  See also Declaration of Russell T. Granik ¶ 42, NBA v. 
Williams, 94 Civ. 4488 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (NBA Deputy Commissioner justified salary cap 
in part on grounds of “cost certainty”).  Cf. John Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The 
Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935) (“best of all monopoly profits is a quiet 
life”).
79
 Indeed, this was the basis on which the NBA persuaded the players’ union to agree to a salary 
cap in return for a guaranteed share of hopefully-growing revenues in 1982.  See Interview with 
David Stern, NBA Commissioner, ANTITRUST, Summer 1987, at 27. 
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6. International Competition
Innovations often require creative solutions to achieve optimal results.   In soccer and 
rugby, where competition between teams of all-stars representing their country is traditionally 
profitable, the increasing revenues from both domestic club competition and innovative multi-
national club tournaments create tensions over the number games and the design of tournaments.  
In baseball, basketball and hockey, where North American domestic club competitions dominate, 
there is increasing demand that room be made within schedules for international competition.  
There surely is an optimal balance between international and domestic league competition.  
However, achieving that balance is significantly impeded when domestic leagues are run by the 
clubs.  Lucrative international competitions will inevitably diminish revenues from domestic 
competitions, either by a shortened or interrupted schedule or by reduced consumer appeal from 
having the domestic competition continue without the benefit of international stars.  Side 
payments to facilitate an appropriate balance would be much easier to achieve if the organizer of 
the domestic competition were a single entity rather than a group of clubs, especially a group
where super-majority voting is often required for change.80  Thus, for example, when 
improvements in communication and broadcast technologies made it feasible and desirable to 
develop European-wide club competitions at the end of the 1950s,81the existence of a 
competition organizer separate from the clubs made it possible to develop the competition to the 
80
 In addition to the sports discussed above, cricket is a sport without any significant professional 
club competition except for English county cricket, which is heavily subsidized.  For a proposal 
to create an international club competition, see Ian Preston, Stephen F. Ross, & Stefan 
Szymanski, Seizing the Moment: A Blueprint for Reform of World Cricket (working paper), 
available at http://www.ms.ic.ac.uk/stefan/.
81
 The midwife of European club football championships was the French newspaper L'Equipe, 
which brought together Europe's 18 leading clubs in 1955. See 4 ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL, Part 
XVIII, ch. 7 (A. H. Fabian and Geoffrey Green eds. 1960).
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point that today the Champions League is probably the most successful club competition in 
world soccer.82
7. Summary of economic comparisons between club-run and vertically separate leagues
The industrial organization of a sports competition is a complex endeavor, requiring those 
who develop the product for sale to fans to account for many different considerations.  More 
franchises increase national television audiences and attract new fans, while modestly diluting 
playing talent and reducing games between highly attractive clubs.  More telecasts or webcasts 
increase revenues from rights purchasers and sponsors, but may affect live gate or ratings from 
other telecasts currently under contract.  Merchandise often is sold because of league rather than 
club popularity and can often be efficiently sold collectively, yet individual club initiatives might 
allow for localized opportunities that league marketers will miss.  Determining an optimal level 
of competitive balance and devising a mechanism to efficiently allocate players among clubs to 
maximize consumer appeal is enormously difficult.  Increased globalization permits greater 
interest in international competition, but the huge potential for revenues from competition among 
national teams or international club tournaments must be offset against losses from domestic 
competition.  These trade-offs are challenging enough for skilled professionals to accomplish.  
However, executives of club-run leagues face an additional formidable obstacle.  They must not 
82
 The Champions League is organized by UEFA, an organization comprised of the various 
domestic federations that govern European football.  For a brief discussion of how soccer 
federations govern the sport, see notes 137-38 infra and accompanying text.  For the popularity 
of Champions League matches internationally, see, e.g., http://www.uefa.com/newsfiles/82383.pdf.  At 
the same time, the integration of national governance with continental governance (UEFA is 
governed by representatives of each nation’s federation, rather than by an independent body) has 
resulted in the maintenance of two overlapping competitions each year – one European, one 
national – which may not be the most efficient way to organize the competition.  See Tom Hoehn 
& Stefan Szymanski, The Americanization of European Football, 28 ECON. POL. 205 (1999)
(advocating creation of pan-European league of 60 clubs in ten conferences who would no longer 
compete in domestic competitions.)
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only develop a business model that optimizes these trade-offs in a way that maximizes profits for 
the sport, but their model must also be presented for approval to owners who, based on their own 
long-term, short-term, or other strategic interests, will endorse or reject the proposal; often a 
super-majority of individual clubs must approve.  Although in theory side payments can be made 
to any owners adversely affected by a model that maximizes league profits, the difficulty in 
agreeing on these payments can lead to inefficient rules that reduce consumer appeal as well as 
league-wide profits.
Predictions made in this Article about how The League might implement its authority to 
maximize profits and consumer appeal are primarily illustrative.  What is critical is that The 
League, unlike the clubs acting collectively, has the incentive to determine efficiently how 
sporting competitions are conducted and the business of sport is run.  The League, unlike the 
clubs acting collectively, has the incentive to optimally set the number and location of franchises.  
The League, unlike the clubs collectively, has the incentive to determine the optimal sharing of 
revenues from broadcasting, licensing, and sponsorships, in order to capture both operational 
efficiencies and eliminate welfare-decreasing externalities.  To promote competitive balance or 
otherwise permit clubs to enhance consumer appeal, revenues retained by The League will be 
divided between a return on investment for The League’s stockholders and targeted re-
investment in prizes or revenue redistribution.  Unlike the clubs acting collectively, The League 
has the incentive to design rules regulating labor markets that maximize profits and minimize 
costs consistent with the need to collectively bargain with the players.  The League has the 
incentive to hold club management accountable for the quality of their stewardship.  Finally, 
removing the need to establish the benefits of welfare-enhancing innovations like international 
play for a super-majority of individual clubs will facilitate the implementation of these 
consumer-enhancing new competitions.
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D. Legal Advantages of Vertical Separation Between The League and its Clubs
The traditional legal response to allegedly anticompetitive acts by club-run monopoly 
sports leagues has been to scrutinize these restraints for reasonableness under the Sherman Act.  
Although league attorneys and some academic defenders have argued that club-run leagues are 
themselves “single entities” whose intra-league decisions, like those of a single corporation, are 
not considered conspiracies in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, that 
argument has been overwhelmingly rejected by the courts.83  Indeed, one of the principal 
doctrinal insights to be gleaned from the economic analysis set forth in this Article is that club-
run leagues differ significantly from single-entity leagues in the way in which they are operated,
further justifying continued close scrutiny of the former.84
83
 Earlier cases are catalogued in Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive 
Restraints and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
133, 146 n.35 (2001) [hereinafter Antitrust Options].  For academic commentary in favor and 
opposed to the single entity defense as applied to club-run leagues, see Misunderstood Alliance, 
supra note 74, at 549 n.136.  Cf. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 
2002), where the district court’s rejection of an antitrust claim based on the single entity 
argument was criticized and the result affirmed on other grounds.
84 Cf. Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 603 (7th Cir. 
1996) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (sports leagues can make inefficient decisions where individual 
teams can gain at the expense of the league).  
Even Professor Gary Roberts, the principal academic advocate for treating club-run leagues as 
single entities, has recognized that:
there is a legitimate concern that the structure of a league, unlike that of other business 
organizations, may cause, albeit infrequently, individual club economic interest to be 
contrary to the interests of the league as a whole. While it is unusual for partnerships or 
corporations to be organized such that a proposal enhancing the efficiency or profitability 
of the firm as a whole is contrary to the economic interest of any partner or shareholder, 
the universal sports league practice of allocating all or most of the nontelevision, game-
generated revenues to the home club makes the potential more likely in some sports league 
contexts.
Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: the Use and Abuse of Section 1 to 
Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 219, 295 (1984).  Our principal 
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One of the many advantages in creating The League would be that its structure would 
preclude many of the controversial antitrust decisions against sports leagues, either because The 
League would be unlikely to impose the challenged restraint or because the burden on an 
antitrust plaintiff challenging decisions of a single corporate entity separate from clubs is much 
greater than the burden of attacking decisions of clubs who agree to lessen competition among 
themselves.  The League will enjoy much greater flexibility than a club-run league in (1) the sale 
of broadcast rights, (2) decisions relating to entry and franchise relocation, (3) the creation of 
balance-enhancing or otherwise efficient rules governing clubs’ competition for the services of 
players, and (4) the implementation of regulations relating to the structure of club ownership.
Because the common law vests the right to telecast a ball game in the home team,85 antitrust 
law views all rights sales by a club-run league as collective sales.  These sales are subject to the 
Sherman Act, and will be struck down where their effect is to reduce viewership or render output 
unresponsive to consumer demand.86  Where sports competitions are organized by The League, 
we envision that the clubs’ common law television rights would be transferred to the League as 
difference is with Roberts’ belief that “in the overwhelming majority of instances, the interests of 
the league will coincide with those of individual clubs,” id. at n.261, while we have identified a 
wide variety of areas where we believe that club-run leagues will behave differently than a 
league controlled separately.  In suggesting that club-run leagues enjoy single-entity status unless 
a plaintiff shows that a minority of clubs actually vetoed a proposal that would benefit the league 
and the majority of clubs, id. at 296, Roberts also ignores the distinct possibility that a majority 
of club owners will engage, over time, in a tacit agreement to adhere to policies that benefit each 
of them as club owners even if the league as a whole will suffer, or the alternative scenario 
where the majority agree not to pursue an efficient innovation because of an inability to agree on 
the distribution of profits.
85
 Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
86
 National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).  See also
Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 
EMORY L.J. 463 (1990) [hereinafter “Cable Contracts”].  A major exception is if a league sells a 
package of games to a free-to-air television network.  Congress has passed a specific and limited 
exemption from antitrust scrutiny for such sales.  Sports Broadcasting Act, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 
75 Stat. 732 (1961), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291 -94.
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part of the franchise agreement.  All subsequent rights sales from The League to programmers or 
networks would no longer be viewed as a collective sale for purposes of the Sherman Act.87
The franchise agreement provision initially granting all rights to The League would 
remain subject to section 1, but we believe that it would be upheld as being, on balance, welfare 
enhancing.  Allowing The League to distribute all broadcast rights avoids the significant 
collective action problems when clubs individually sell rights and then must reach agreement as 
to how revenue is shared.  Moreover, it provides The League with a critical base of revenue that 
can be used to promote competitive balance, through outright redistribution or through 
competitive prizes.88
87
 The League’s freedom to license broadcast rights would still, however, be subject to antitrust 
scrutiny to the extent that a particular transaction had demonstrable anticompetitive effects in 
broadcast markets.  See, e.g., Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263 
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (plaintiff claimed exclusive contract monopolized competition for radio in 
Houston-Galveston area).  See also Monopolies and Merger Commission, British Sky 
Broadcasting Group PLC and Manchester United PLC: A Report on the Proposed Merger (April 
17, 1999), available at http://www.competition -
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1999/index.htm (blocking acquisition of leading British 
soccer team by leading pay television programmer in part based on concerns that acquisition 
would distort competition for lucrative soccer television rights between acquiring firm and its 
rivals).
88
 See text accompanying notes 65-66, supra.
The downside to this legal advantage that The League would have over club-run leagues is 
that the ongoing evolution of the market for pay television could lead The League to shift many 
games now shown on free-to-air television to a more expensive medium.  Shifts away from free-
to-air are becoming more prevalent in club-run leagues, see ZIMBALIST, supra note 51, ch. 7, but 
may be inhibited by the inability of clubs to agree on how to divide the proceeds from collective 
rights sales to pay programmers. While an agreement among rivals to collectively shift the sale 
of their rights to more expensive tiers may  constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, Cable 
Contracts, supra note 86, at 481, the unilateral sale by The League to a satellite or pay 
programmer would not.  We do not believe that this concern outweighs the benefits in allowing 
The League to control broadcast rights, but if this shift is socially undesirable Congress can 
follow the pattern of many other developed countries that have enacted “Listed Events” 
legislation that specifies that key events (championships, late playoffs, a game of the week) must 
be on free-to-air television.  See, e.g., Broadcasting Act 1996, §§ 97-105 (U.K.); Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Aus.) (authorizing minister to list events required to be available on free-to-
air television).
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Perhaps the area where the specter of antitrust liability poses the greatest concern for club-
run leagues concern questions of franchise entry and relocation.  The collective refusal of current 
clubs to permit new entry or to approve a relocation opens club-run leagues to lawsuits 
characterizing these decisions as group boycotts or unreasonable horizontal trade restraints.89  As 
the Supreme Court noted in NCAA, horizontal restraints among competitors are generally treated 
with suspicion under the antitrust laws.90  In contrast, there will be minimal antitrust scrutiny of 
The League’s entry and relocation decisions.  Even for club-run leagues, courts are generally 
deferential on questions of entry,91 and there is even less risk if, as we predict, The League will 
maintain some basis for efficiently determining the optimal number of teams and for allowing 
efficient entry where the dynamics of the market indicate.  Antitrust scrutiny of relocation 
decisions have focused on a fear that club-run leagues were denying relocation to protect local 
89 See, e.g., St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm’n v. National Football League, 154 F.3d 851 
(8th Cir. 1998) (league requirement that Rams pay a fee for permission to relocate to St. Louis 
was reasonable; allegations that league agreed that Rams would be only team to negotiate with 
St. Louis unproven); National Basketball Ass’n v. San Diego Clippers Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 
562 (9th Cir. 1987) (league relocation rules are not per se illegal but must be evaluated on a case 
by case basis); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 
1381 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming jury verdict that NFL refusal to allow Oakland Raiders relocation 
to Los Angeles was unreasonable effort to protect Los Angeles Rams franchise from intra-league 
competition); San Francisco Seals v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 
1974) (no claim of any injury to competition from bar on relocation of franchise to Vancouver); 
State v. Milwaukee Braves, 1966 Trade Cas. ¶ 71,738 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milwaukee Co.) (National 
League’s approval of Braves’ relocation to Atlanta and refusal to expand to Milwaukee 
constituted monopolization in violation of state antitrust statute), rev’d on other grounds, 144 
N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966) (application of state antitrust statute to league rules requiring uniformity 
constituted an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
90 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100.
91
 In Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), the court 
rejected an antitrust suit by a would-be entrant to the NFL.  The court reasoned that, unlike the 
Raiders case, there was no serious claim that a Memphis entrant into the league was rejected by 
an inefficient monopoly venture in order to protect an existing rival (the closest other franchise, 
the then-St. Louis Cardinals, was over 250 miles away), and that leaving markets such as 
Memphis open actually encouraged new inter-league rivalry by promoting entry.
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incumbents or because of an inability to agree on dividing any surplus from relocation.  If, as we 
expect, franchise agreements give The League primary control over franchise location, these 
concerns are substantially reduced.  As a matter of legal doctrine, while the NFL’s refusal to 
allow the Oakland Raiders to move to Los Angeles was viewed as a horizontal restraint, any 
decision by The League would be considered a vertical restraint and a plaintiff would have a 
heavy burden to show that The League’s interest was not the same as fans.92
With regard to labor restraints, club-run leagues are today substantially shielded by the 
Supreme Court’s expansion of a judicially-created “non-statutory labor exemption” to cover any 
restraints subject to collective bargaining under federal labor law when they primarily affect the 
labor market.93  However, players retain the option of decertifying their union as their bargaining 
representative and filing an antitrust suit instead, alleging that clubs competing for players’ 
services were illegally restraining trade among themselves.94  The League would face no such 
threat if collective bargaining fails and it centrally controlled all labor relations.95
As with the initial grant of television rights in the franchise agreement, the provisions 
granting The League central control over player assignment would initially be subject to 
Sherman Act scrutiny.  Although we believe that the increased likelihood that The League would 
92 Compare Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (“vertical” 
territorial restraint imposed by television manufacturer on locations where its product could be 
sold at retail subject to rule of reason) with United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 
(1965) (“horizontal” territorial restraint imposed by auto manufacturer at behest of organized 
group of retailers held illegal per se) and United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) 
(territorial restraint imposed by trademark owner on licensees considered “horizontal” where 
licensees controlled the corporation owning the trademark).  This distinction was reaffirmed in 
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
93
 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
94 See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (D. Minn. 1991).
95
 Although centrally-controlled labor relations were subjected to close antitrust review in Fraser 
v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), the league was not found to be independent 
of rival clubs but rather was controlled by the club owners.  Id. at 57 & n.5.
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create rules designed to optimally allocate players among teams is a strong case in favor of the 
reasonableness of this approach, players may fear such a restructuring and argue that these 
efficiencies do not justify the elimination of competition among independent actors for their 
services.  Because we believe that an optimal approach would create a generally free labor 
market,96 with franchisee clubs bidding through an internal auction for players, perhaps the best 
solution for The League would be to assure players of their fair share of the benefits from this 
competition through a collective bargaining agreement, thus foreclosing an antitrust challenge.  
Indeed, having a long-term collective bargaining agreement in place before the initial sale of 
shares in The League were offered would probably enhance the value of offering.97  Moreover, 
such bargaining may well be necessary anyway under federal labor law, to the extent that the 
restructuring of a league would be considered to have such a significant effect on player wages 
and working conditions as to constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining.98
96 See text accompanying notes 69-79, supra.
97
 Current owners may find that their capital gain on an initial public offering in shares in The 
League would be maximized by creating The League prior to issuance of public stock, securing a 
highly regarded Board of Directors and executive team, and securing a collective bargaining 
agreement with players.  Cf. Taylor Milk Co. v. Teamsters, 248 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(describing merger where acquiring firm desired to have new collective bargaining arrangement 
secured before closing deal).
98
 In Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), the court held that an 
agreement among owners to provide compensation (either agreed-upon or to be determined by 
the league commissioner) when successfully bidding for the rights of a player previously 
employed by another club was a mandatory subject of bargaining under federal labor law.  
Although the court acknowledged that the rule did not facially concern wages, hours, and 
working conditions, the statutory scope of the mandatory subject of bargaining under § 8(d) of 
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), it concluded that the agreement operated 
in practice “to restrict a player’s ability to move from one team to another and depresses player 
salaries.”  543 F.2d at 615.  Although The League could construct its franchise agreement with 
clubs in such a way that there would be no restriction on player movement or downward effect 
on player salaries, certainly the restructuring proposed here would give The League the power to 
harm players’ interests.  The practical effect would appear to be similar to Mackey, and thus a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.
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Finally, leagues have also faced antitrust litigation concerning the creation or application of 
policies concerning ownership.  For example, the National Football League’s rule against 
corporate ownership of its clubs was found to unreasonably shield owners from competition 
from more efficiently-structured entities,99 while the NBA’s rejection of a particular buyer was 
upheld.100 Antitrust liability for club-run leagues ownership rules is increased because the rules 
restrict the structure of their competitors.  Plaintiffs will allege that incumbents are trying to 
hamper their rivals by precluding more efficient ways of obtaining capital or organizing rival
clubs.  If The League unilaterally imposed its own rules on franchisees, it would be difficult to 
construct a theory of competitive harm.101
This issue presents somewhat of a tactical dilemma for the party most likely to be affected 
– the relevant players’ union.  An assertion that restructuring is a topic of mandatory bargaining 
assists in the process of collective negotiation, but under Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 
231 (1996), protects the restructuring from antitrust attack.  The contrary assertion would leave 
open an antitrust challenge, but potentially foreclose effective bargaining.  We suspect that 
unions will generally prefer to enlarge their rights under labor law rather than reserve their 
options to file expensive antitrust suits.  Cf. Jessica Cohen, Note, Sharing the Wealth: Don’t Call 
us.  We’ll Call You: Why Revenue Sharing is a Permissive Subject and Therefore the Labor 
Exemption Does Not Apply, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 609 (2002) (based 
on questionable factual assumption that effect on revenue sharing on owners’ willingness to bid 
for players is too remote, concludes that revenue sharing is not mandatory subject of bargaining).
If the restructuring is the result of legislation or court order, the fact of restructuring would 
not, of course, be a mandatory subject of bargaining.  Obviously, The League would need to 
enter into a new collective bargaining agreement with the players.
99
 Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.2d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
100
 Levin v. National Basketball Ass’n, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
101
 In Sullivan, the NFL made the legitimate argument that the overall appeal of the league can 
be affected by the ownership structure of participating clubs.  Club-run leagues face a 
disadvantage in devising optimal policies however, because it is in the interest of each owner to 
tacitly agree that virtually any high bidder seeking to purchase a club from an existing owner 
should be able to do so.  The jury in Sullivan was persuaded that the fear of competition from 
clubs owned by publicly traded corporations trumped this concern, 34 F.3d at 1100, but The 
League would be much more likely to prevent clubs from being operated by those whose 
ownership structure was inimical to the best interests of the overall competition.
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Antitrust scrutiny of agreements among clubs participating in The League would remain in 
place to protect consumers from anticompetitive harm.102 The Sherman Act would properly 
constrain clubs’ ability to jointly negotiate with The League and rival competition organizers.  If 
a rival can organize a competition more efficiently than The League, it is free to bid for 
individual teams to compete in its competition.  A rival league could conceivably pursue a 
strategy of attracting clubs by offering them greater power and authority, similar to that now 
enjoyed in club-run leagues, and that such competition will result in a structure no different than 
currently exists.  We believe that such a strategy is unlikely to succeed.  Precisely because club-
run structures are less efficient, it is difficult to see how a new entrant could make an offer 
sufficient to attract so many clubs that The League would not remain viable.  To use two simple 
examples, if a new entrant made an offer aimed at attracting small-market clubs, The League 
would remain viable on a smaller basis focusing on its large markets; if a new entrant made an 
offer aimed at the top clubs in major cities, The League with its preexisting brand loyalty and 
infrastructure could add additional franchises in these major markets, which are likely to be 
capable of supporting additional teams.  If we assume that The League will remain as a viable 
entrant in the market, then clubs considering jumping to a rival will have to weigh the more 
attractive package offered against the lost profits because of the usually fierce inter-league 
rivalry that will follow.  On the other hand, a rival that develops a model that really is more 
102
 Although agreements among competing clubs would remain suspect under the antitrust laws, 
clubs participating in a restructured league should have much less of a need to agree on 
competition-restricting rules.  Procompetitive joint ventures, such as joint scouting combines, 
multi-club training facilities, or joint marketing of products (like sponsorship rights) in markets 
where clubs lack market power, would pose little risk of antitrust liability.  Horizontal 
agreements among clubs that threatened to increase price, reduce output, or render output 
unresponsive to consumer demand would also be subject to prohibition by The League in a well-
drafted franchise agreement.
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efficient than The League’s should be able to attract almost all the clubs thru individual 
negotiations.103
Because The League would likely be the dominant provider of competition organizing 
services in each sport, it would still remain liable under section 2 of the Sherman Act for 
attempted or actual monopolization.104  However, its liability in this regard is no greater than that 
faced by club-run leagues today.  Antitrust law does not forbid the exercise of monopoly power, 
only its illegal maintenance.105  The law reasons that monopoly pricing actually encourages entry 
and thus does not allow a firm to illegally maintain monopoly power.106  Although the Sherman 
Act prohibits The League from engaging in anticompetitive acts to maintain its dominance, to 
prove illegal monopoly maintenance a plaintiff must prove not only that rules are exclusionary 
103
 If the League’s viability is threatened by wholesale defection of clubs, we would expect that 
The League is unlikely to continue to enforce player contracts (and pay player salaries) for 
athletes without a club to play for, thus opening up the market for clubs in the new league.
104
 Courts have generally found that the dominant league in a major sport possesses monopoly 
power.  See, e.g., United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 
1364 (2d Cir. 1988); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶64,378 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1981), at 74,756.  The reasoning of these and other Supreme Court precedents 
support a similar conclusion for Major League Baseball.  See, e.g.,  International Boxing Club v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959) (ordinary boxing matches do not constrain power of those 
dominating championship boxing); National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 
U.S. 85 (1984) (college football is a separate market).
105 See United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1361 (2d Cir. 
1988) (upholding jury verdict that a monopolist “is free to set as its legitimate goal the 
maximization of its own profits so long as it does not exercise its power to maintain that 
power”).
106
 As the court explained in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d 
Cir. 1970), the mere exercise of monopoly power “is not in itself anticompetitive.  Indeed, 
although a monopolist may be expected to charge a somewhat higher price than would prevail in 
a competitive market, there is probably no better way for it to guarantee that its dominance will 
be challenged than by greedily extracting the highest price it can.”  In contrast, for example, 
Article 82 of the European Treaty condemns not monopolization but “abuse of dominant 
position,” an offense that includes imposing “unfair prices.”  See Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, at 82, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 173.
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but they are unnecessarily so – that is, that they are inefficient.  Rules designed to promote 
consumer appeal or to achieve efficiencies are lawful.
To be sure, The League – like current club-run leagues – could not engage in blatantly 
anticompetitive acts, such as blacklisting players who sign with rival leagues.107  In addition, 
foreclosing rivals from essential inputs would subject The League to liability.  Thus, The League 
could not tie up every television network.108  The League would also have to ensure that player 
contracts were structured so that a rival could have access in any given year to a sufficient 
number of players (either amateurs coming out of college, minor leaguers, or veteran free agents) 
in order to viably compete.109
Because even in natural monopoly markets antitrust laws favors competition for the 
monopoly,110 it could be argued that the best way to promote competition in the market for 
107 See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
108
 Although not proven on the facts, this was a principal theory of the USFL’s monopolization 
case.  United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
109 See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 
462, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (provisions reserving all major and minor league players to NHL clubs 
or affiliates for three years constituted monopolization by precluding rival league from entry.)
110
 As the court noted in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1977):
To hold otherwise could effectively mean that a defendant is entitled to remain free of 
competition unless the plaintiff can prove, not only that he would be a viable competitor, but 
also that he and defendant both would survive.  This result would be ironic indeed: we cannot 
say that it is in the public interest to have the incumbent as its sole theatre, or its sole 
newspaper, or its sole football team, merely because the incumbent got there first.  Assuming 
that there is no identity of performance, the public has an obvious interest in competition, 
“even though that competition be an elimination bout” [quoting Union Leader Corp. v. 
Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 n.4 (1st Cir. 1960) and citing Greenville 
Pub. Co., Inc. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 1974)].  ‘It has been the law 
for centuries,’ Justice Holmes once wrote, ‘that a man may set up a business in a small 
country town, too small to support more than one, although thereby he expects and intends to 
ruin some one already there, and succeeds in his attempt.’ Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 
1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896).  The newcomer and the incumbent may both succeed, or either or 
both may fail; this is what competition is all about.
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competition organizing services is to prohibit The League’s control of player contracts.  If 
players were contracted to individual clubs, then a new entrant could compete by simply 
attracting the club owner, rather than develop a league of minimum viable scale by individually 
signing players.  We do not believe that The League’s control of players – assuming that after 
any given season a reasonable number of player contracts will expire – is sufficiently 
anticompetitive to constitute monopolization.  As noted above, there are significant efficiencies 
in allowing The League negotiate as a single entity with the players’ union to devise an optimal 
scheme to allocate players among clubs participating in its competition.111  Collective action 
problems make such an agreement with club employers more difficult.  Moreover, The League 
might allocate a player to a particular club precisely because this allocation is efficient in the 
context of the club’s participation in the competition organized by The League.  If The League 
feared that an individual club might take all its players and participate in another competition, 
The League might allocate players differently, and less optimally in the short-run.  Foregoing 
clear benefits to The League’s competition in the short-run, because of the possibility that entry 
into the presumptively natural monopoly market for competition organizing would be marginally 
facilitated if clubs employed players, would not seem to be reasonable.112
On the other hand, it is more difficult to see efficiency justifications for The League’s 
control of club-based trademarks.  Allowing clubs to keep their trademarks (subject to limited 
assignment to The League for licensing purposes, as now occurs) if they choose to join another 
league would enhance the opportunity for rivalry in competition-organizing services and the 
111 See text accompanying notes 69-77 supra.
112
 If instead we presume that the market for competition organizing is capable of stable rivalry 
between competing leagues, then a dominant league’s employment of players, precluding a rival 
for competing for clubs to participate in its own competition, becomes more complex.  A number 
of commentators have advocated horizontal restructuring of existing leagues into multiple 
competing leagues that agree on a championship but economically compete for franchises, 
players, broadcast rights, and merchandise.  See ZIMBALIST, supra note 51, at 155, id. at 189 n. 
42 (citing others to same effect).
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likelihood of The League’s displacement by a more efficient rival.  In similar fashion, although 
franchise agreements can reasonably be set at a sufficient duration to allow for long-term 
planning, unduly long franchise agreements could operate to monopolize if they precluded any 
ability to lure existing clubs to a new league.113
In short, an independent entity organizing a popular sporting competition is likely to enjoy 
significant advantages over the tradition club-run leagues.  The competition is more likely to be 
designed to enhance consumer appeal and operated in a manner to maximize overall profits.  
Because The League’s business decisions will either be unilateral or “vertical” agreements with 
independent clubs, The League will enjoy significant legal flexibility to make decisions that 
would otherwise risk serious antitrust liability.  The result, given the assumed absence of 
competition, should be greater profitability.
III. IMPLEMENTING A VERTICAL RESTRUCTURING OF A DOMINANT SPORTS 
LEAGUE
In a well-functioning market, those with the power to establish the structure of sports 
leagues would not design leagues that result in a sub-optimal number and location of franchises, 
a sub-optimal exploitation of broadcast rights, inefficient marketing of sponsorship and 
licensing, labor markets that are neither cost-minimizing nor efficient in allocating players 
among clubs, lack of effective oversight of each club’s stewardship of its valuable franchise, and 
under-exploitation of international opportunities.  Absent transaction costs, of course, the 
assignment of rights to club owners would not affect the ultimate structure of a league: where a 
revenue-enhancing alternative is available, side payments can be made to assure the desired 
113
 For analysis on this point, see XI HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1802g (1998).
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result.114  However, where transaction costs are significant, the allocation of control rights to club 
owners can significantly affect the distribution of resources.115
In this section, we discuss ways in which owners of club-run leagues might effectuate a 
restructuring that would be profitable for them and result in a more efficient league.  At the same 
time, we recognize that – unlike most other businesses that could profitably restructure – neither 
actual or potential rivals nor the market for corporate control constrains individual club owners’ 
pursuit of their own interests at the expense of an efficient league operation, and that there is a 
significant possibility that the same transactions costs that prevent current leagues from 
achieving efficient results significantly minimize the likelihood that an efficient re-structuring of 
sports leagues would be voluntarily embraced by current club owners.  Still, a solid promise of 
cash today and the opportunity to share in the gains from an even more profitable business 
operation in the future provides one of the surest incentives for parties to overcome transactions 
costs.  After an exploration of why vertically separate leagues have not been established already 
if, as we claim, the idea is so efficient, the section concludes with a detailed analysis of legal 
options that courts or Congress could use to justify an involuntary restructuring through 
government intervention should transactions costs prove to difficult to overcome on a voluntary 
basis.
A. Voluntary Implementation Through Private Ordering
Experts in corporate finance can offer myriad ways to implement the creation of The 
League as a separate business entity and the assignment of rights necessary for The League to 
organize the sports competition efficiently.  The means of implementation will likely differ 
114 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
115 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 33.
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depending on whether the restructuring occurs at the initiative of the clubs or their management, 
or rather occurs at the behest of outside investors.  We offer the following discussion to illustrate 
how a restructuring may occur.
If the clubs or their commissioners were to agree with this Article’s conclusions, one 
effective way to vertically separate would be to create a The League as a separate corporate 
entity (“NFL, Inc.”) with a relatively small percentage of outstanding shares created as voting 
stock and most of the shares retained as preferred non-voting stock.  The return on an initial 
public offering of voting stock would be maximized if The League had a high-profile board of 
directors independent of current club owners, and had already entered into a new collective 
bargaining agreement with the players and detailed franchise agreements with existing clubs.  
Under this scheme, current owners would profit by receiving cash from the proceeds of the 
offering and from potential capital gains from the appreciation of preferred shares in The 
League.  Owners would retain the ownership in their clubs, although obviously the franchise 
value of the clubs would be substantially reduced under this restructuring.  If appropriate, owners 
could be assigned a different number of shares to be redeemed in the initial public offering or as 
preferred shares.  The ability of current owners to retain equity in The League makes this 
approach attractive to them, but to achieve the benefits of vertical separation, it is critical that 
their investment be non-voting (or strictly limited to a small percentage of voting stock).  To 
facilitate the marketability of the preferred stock, it can be made immediately convertible to 
voting stock if acquired by anyone not involved with the operation of a club.  Thus, once the 
market price had been established after the initial public offering, club owners could with skilled 
advice from their own investment advisers gradually sell off their non-voting stock and thus 
capture almost all of the surplus from the restructuring.  Alternatively, in light of the continuing 
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growth of the value of sports franchises, club owners could hold onto their stock, which, along 
with the value of their franchise, could continue to appreciate.116
The foregoing approach would require the active cooperation and leadership by those 
currently owning and operating the league.  If the initiative came from outside the league, a more 
effective approach would probably be for a relatively small group of investors to form a new 
entity, The League, which would initially be closely owned, combining those with sizable assets 
with those knowledgeable about the sports business.  The League would then tender an offer to 
acquire those rights necessary to organize the competition from current club owners.  If an initial 
offer was not accepted by the three-quarter super-majority required by most league constitutions, 
then The League’s organizers could enter into separate negotiations with individual club owners 
in an effort to find the sufficient number to effectuate the purchase.  Once the tender was 
accepted, The League could then enter into franchise agreements with clubs, and a collective 
bargaining agreement with the union.  With the new structure in place, the owners could then 
turn to public equity markets, both to realize a gain on their successful organizational efforts and 
also to refinance the use of debt or their own personal assets required to provide the initial cash 
payments to current owners.117
B. Why Current Owners May be Unwilling to Restructure Even if Efficient
Generally, when those outside a firm believe that the business can be operated more 
profitably, a market for corporate control facilitates the acquisition of the firm’s assets by these 
116
 The value of sports franchises tripled in the last decade. See
http://users.pullman.com/rodfort/SportsBusiness/BizFrame.htm.  We thank Professor Cynthia 
Williams and investment analyst R. J. Bukovac for assistance regarding the mechanics of the 
restructuring.
117
 Of course, as with the initial public offering, payment to the club owners could also include 
preferred stock in The League.
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more efficient operators.118  However, even if restructuring of a dominant sports league would be 
efficient, club owners may not agree to sell. A simple reason why club owners may not choose 
to surrender control of their club-run leagues to a more efficient centralized operation is that they 
do not have to.119  Sports leagues do not face significant competition from actual or potential 
product market rivals.120  As a result, market retribution will not be swift121 should owners fail to 
achieve efficient results.122  Even club-run leagues might face pressure for greater efficiency if a 
market for corporate control existed to create pressure on club officials to maximize profits for 
club shareholders.  But sports clubs are not publicly traded in North America, and even where a 
club is a subsidiary of a publicly traded corporation, the parent often has sufficient strategic 
118 See generally WILLIAM A. KLEIN AND JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND 
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 191-94 (8th ed. 2002).
119 Cf. SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE: THE FIRST 20 YEARS (Michael Cader, ed.) (1994) (famous line 
by telephone operator “Ernestine” popularized by Lily Tomlin: “Next time you complain about 
your phone service, why don't you try using two Dixie cups with a string. We don't care. We 
don't have to. (snort) We're the Phone Company.") The idea that firms with monopoly power 
have the luxury to conduct their affairs inefficiently is widely supported.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (monopoly power 
“deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy,” “immunity from competition is a 
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress” and competition “is necessary to 
counteract the inevitable disposition to let well enough alone”); John Hicks, Annual Survey of 
Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935) (“best of all 
monopoly profits is a quiet life”).
120 See Monopoly Sports Leagues, supra note 9 at 647-48.  Judicial precedents support this 
conclusion. See note 104, supra.
121 Cf. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(noting swift market retribution as a characteristic of firms lacking market power).
122
 The inefficiencies engaged in by monopoly sports leagues, and an explanation for how 
competition would eliminate these inefficiencies, is discussed in Monopoly Sports Leagues, 
supra note 9.
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interests that efficient operation of the league is not a principal concern.123  Thus, a series of 
hostile takeovers of clubs is not a feasible option.124
Another reason why owners may choose not to voluntarily restructure is ego.  Most owners 
have already succeeded in other businesses and are personally wealthy.  Although they would 
likely retain the perquisites of ownership of a club/franchisee in a competition organized by The 
league (owners’ box, accepting the presentation of the champions’ trophy), they will have to give 
up the power to make the rules, and have to accept directives from others.  Even if this Article is 
correct that there are substantial efficiencies to restructuring, when the value of these efficiencies 
are divided among all the owners, it may not be sufficient to compensate for the loss of power.  
To illustrate, suppose that the current aggregate value of all Major League Baseball franchises 
were $9 billion,125 and that a vertical separation would result in efficiencies sufficient to increase 
the combined value of MLB and club assets to $10 billion.  The current thirty owners would then 
realize an average profit (some immediately realized in cash, some through increased valuation 
of preferred stock in The League) of $33 million.126  Although the precise contours of the transfer 
of rights could well result in some owners receiving more and some less, it is certainly plausible 
that, for more than one-quarter of the owners, this sum is insufficient to deprive them of the 
power and control they now possess.
123
 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to 
Redress Anticompetitive Restraints and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 
52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 133, 145-46 (2001).
124
 Moreover, because of the strong public aversion to having different clubs owned by a single 
firm, the outside investors cannot realistically pursue a strategy of buying up individual teams 
until they can persuade the club-run league to restructure.
125
 According to Forbes magazine’s annual estimates, the 2003 combined value of franchises 
was $9,131,000.  See “MLB Team Evaluations,” available at 
http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2003/0428/064tab2.html.
126
 To be precise, assuming the Montreal Expos remain under the ownership of the league, 
individual owners would see their investment increase in value by $34.5 million.
52
The most likely reason that owners may reject the opportunity to vertically restructure their 
sport is the principal reason that vertical integration is inefficient – the significant transaction 
costs that exist whenever a potential pareto opportunity presents itself to a club-run league.  The 
vast proceeds ($1 billion in my hypothetical illustration) would have to be divided among the 
current owners.  Even George Steinbrenner would likely approve the concept if, say, $400 
million went to the New York Yankees.  Of course, the owner of the Kansas City Royals would 
initially insist on a pro-rata distribution, which would never be accepted.  Given the potential 
revenue growth were sports leagues efficiently organized by an entity separate from the clubs, 
perhaps a skilled investment banking firm would be able to overcome these obstacles and secure 
agreement to proceed with a lucrative initial public offering.  Yet, on the other hand, if owners 
can’t agree on how to distribute small amounts available from increased sale of rights to out-of-
market broadcasts,127 one cannot be too sanguine about the likelihood of voluntary restructuring.
C. Why Leagues Haven’t Done This Already if it is Such a Good Idea
To be sure, each major North American professional team sports league has always been 
vertically integrated.  We believe that this is due in part to the dynamic economics of fledgling 
sports leagues that lack market power, and in part due to an accident of history rather than any 
inherent requirement of vertical integration to maximize consumer appeal or efficiently operate a 
competition in a team sport.  
The traditional model of a vertically integrated, club-run league was developed when 
baseball’s National League was created in 1876.128  This model emerged as a consequence of two 
factors.  First, a free-for-all then existing in baseball – characterized by (a) barnstorming teams 
127
 Cf. Chicago Bulls, discussed supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
128
 The authoritative work on the origins of baseball, from which the textual narrative is derived, 
is HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS (1960).
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attracting support as long as they are winning and then collapsing when they lose (a rational 
bubble), (b) team owners dissipating all the rents in competing to hire the best talent, and (c) 
opportunities for gambling that generated significant match fixing – was undermining interest in 
the rapidly growing national sport.  Second, revenues associated with baseball in the late 19th 
century were almost entirely generated locally by clubs, principally through sales of admission 
tickets.129  The founders of the significantly named “National League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs” set out to create a new kind of equilibrium: a league with stable membership.  The new 
arrangement130invested members with a stake in its long term success (to combat short run 
incentives for match fixing), granted exclusive territories guaranteeing a local monopoly 
(providing an incentive to invest in the local market) and established a Reserve Clause to confer  
monopsony rights over the players (ensuring that the income stream from matches accrued 
principally to the owners). The extraordinary success of this model made it not only the basis for 
the National Pastime, but also for the other North American team sports. American sports played 
in other countries adopted this model (e.g. baseball in Japan and Mexico, basketball in 
Australia).131
Although the founders of the National League deemed it natural to integrate governance 
functions with the supply of matches, this was not really inherent but rather a direct consequence 
of the lack of any alternative credible supplier of these services in 1876.  In contrast, in England 
the Football Association (FA) was established in 1863 and had successfully standardized rules 
and maintained oversight of the development of English soccer, and had also developed two 
129 Id., ch. 7.
130
 To bring this about, the league’s principal founder, William A. Hulbert of the Chicago 
Baseball Club (now the White Sox), assembled a talented team by raiding other clubs and then 
secured an agreement from leading clubs in a geographically-balanced group of eight cities from 
Boston to St. Louis. Id., at 77-80.
131
 See ALLEN GUTTMAN, GAMES AND EMPIRES (1994).
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important forms of competition in its own right: the FA Cup, a knock- out competition including 
all members, and international representative football, arguably the most successful competition 
structure ever invented.132  Thus when, in 1888, leading clubs finding the same need as baseball 
teams for a fixed and reliable playing schedule created the Football League, they did not fully 
integrate the competition.  Although in part this may have been due to the desire to continue 
participating in the FA Cup, the founders also believed that it would be both in their interests and 
in the wider interests of football to maintain an independent governing body at the head of the 
sport.133  At the same time, because leading clubs and the FA have always perceived that the 
clubs possess a credible threat to secede from the FA and completely integrate into competition 
organizing,134 the clubs have maintained a significant degree of control so that the modern 
structure of English soccer has many features similar to club-run North American leagues.135 At 
132
 The early history of the game is recounted in GEOFFREY GREEN, SOCCER, THE WORLD GAME: 
A POPULAR HISTORY (1956), ch.3.  Global audiences for the FIFA World Cup played between 
qualifying national teams attracts larger audiences than the Olympics.  FIFA estimated that the 
1998 World Cup Final was watched on TV by more than one billion viewers.  See
http://us.emt4.yimg.com/fifaworldcup.yahoo.com/releases/IP-401-E-TV.pdf.
133
 In the words of  William McGregor, founder of the Football League, "The League should 
never aspire to be a legislating body…by the very nature things the League must be a selfish 
body. Its interests are wholly bound up in the welfare of its affiliated clubs, and what happens 
outside is, in a sense, of secondary importance only … the League has its work to do; the 
[Football] Association has its work to do and there need be no clashing." See INGLIS, supra note 
36, at 11.  Another commentator described the relationship between the FA and League thus: 
"The FA on the one hand [is] the monarchy as it were, with its watchful care and authority over 
the whole of English football: on the other hand [there is] the Football League, with its narrower 
horizons, existing under the licence of the FA."  GREEN, supra note 132, at 62.  
134
 We discuss above why we believe a concerted secession from a competition by leading clubs 
should violate antitrust laws.  See text accompanying note 102, supra.  In England, in recent 
times the commercial power of the clubs has expanded dramatically, resulting in greater 
deference to club interests by the FA.   See, e.g, JOHN WILLIAMS, IS IT ALL OVER? CAN 
FOOTBALL SURVIVE THE PREMIER LEAGUE, 53-60 (1999).
135
 English football clubs control player contracts (subject to legal challenges based on 
competition law or the common law of restraint of trade).  Historically, the clubs accepted FA 
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the same time, the FA has insisted, more controversially, that clubs release players without 
compensation to participate in international representative competition.136  The English model of 
governance has been adopted globally in soccer, with each country’s domestic competition 
operating under the aegis of a national association modeled on the FA, and an association of 
associations acting as governing bodies for each continent,137 and an international federation 
acting as the world governing body.138
When a new league is formed – either where a sport is just developing in the relevant 
market, or where the league is organized as a new entrant to challenge an established incumbent 
league – vertical integration can be extremely important precisely because there is unlikely to be 
a credible supplier of competition organizing services to clubs who might join such a league, and 
club owners are going to be reluctant to participate in such a risky venture without some role in 
controlling the fortunes of the new competition.139  However, today’s owner of the Chicago 
White Sox would not find, as his predecessor William Hulbert did, that there is no one else 
around willing and able to provide competition organizing services.  The explosion in revenues 
labor market restraints such as maximum wages and dividends.  On the maximum wage, see
INGLIS, supra note 36, at 53; on the maximum dividend, see STEFAN SZYMANSKI AND TIM 
KUYPERS, WINNERS AND LOSERS: THE BUSINESS STRATEGY OF FOOTBALL 6, 12, 16, 19 (2000).
136
 Initially, clubs saw the release of players to represent their country as an honor, INGLIS, supra
note 36, at 18, but by the 1960s it was seen increasingly as a burden.  Id. at 243.  Indeed, since 
the FA generates significant income as the organizer of the England soccer team, there seems to 
be a clear conflict of interest; one result has been a partial integration as clubs have tried to 
ensure over the years that they are adequately represented on the committees of the FA.  Id. at 
243, 260.
137
 For example, Europe’s governing body is the Union of European Football Associations 
(UEFA).  See http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/overview/index.html.
138
 The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).  See
http://www.fifa.com/en/organisation/index.html.
139
 The franchise method of business rarely develops from an untried new idea, but typically 
reflects the expansion of a business model that has proven successful elsewhere, either developed 
by the franchisor or acquired by the franchisor from the original innovator. 
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from broadcasting, merchandising, and sponsorships create  huge incentives for vertically 
separate firms to perform these services.  Unlike those seeking to organize Major League 
Soccer,140 competition organizers would likely find many owners interested in participating in the 
dominant professional football competition in the United States, even if they lacked the ability to 
control the league.  
Once a league becomes sufficiently dominant so that vertical integration is no longer 
necessary to attract potential franchisees, it may well retain its traditional restructure simply
because the potential gains from an efficient restructuring are not large enough to justify the 
trouble.  It is only recently that the revenues (primarily from broadcasting) have exploded to such 
a degree that the sort of restructuring proposed in this Article is worth the significant transaction 
costs involved in bringing it about.  To illustrate, suppose hypothetically that vertical separation 
would result in an eleven percent increase in the value of Major League Baseball; while this 
would be approximately $1 billion today, a conservative estimate is that thirty years ago the 
capital gain would only have been about $26 million.141
Moreover, at least one recent development suggests that some current sports executives 
recognize the benefits of vertical separation.  Preventing owners from engaging in self-
aggrandizing opportunistic behavior is seen as a serious problem: according to one sports 
executive, “if [NFL Commissioner] Paul Tagliabue could convert the NFL to a single entity, 
he’d do it tomorrow.”142 Although not formally as separated as The League we suggest in this 
140 See WEILER AND ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 495-97.
141
 Today’s calculation is based on Forbes’ estimate of $9 billion as the aggregate value of 
Major League Baseball franchises today.  See note 125 supra.  The 1973 estimate is based on the 
sale of the New York Yankees in that year, to George Steinbrenner, for $10 million.  See JAMES 
QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY DIRT: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 53 
(1992). A conservative assumption that the Yankees were so poorly managed at the time that 
their value was average among the 24 teams then in baseball would yield an aggregate value of 
$240 million for all teams.
142 See Larry Lebowitz, Leagues are Forming as ‘Single Entities’ Where Decision and Profits 
are Shared by All Owners, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 1997, at 1F
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Article, the Women’s National Basketball Association is run by a Board of Directors with each 
club participating pursuant to an operating agreement that designates revenues and costs for 
which the club is responsible.  Although four of the nine directors come from the group of NBA 
owners who operate WNBA teams, the other five include four owners without WNBA franchises 
and the NBA Commissioner. The Board of WNBA, LLC is ultimately responsible to the 
WNBA’s sole owner, a corporation named NBA Development that in turn is owned by the 
twenty-nine NBA owners.  Thus, while some of the problems that plague club-run leagues could 
rear their head, the benefits in negotiating broadcast rights and sponsorship deals without the fear 
that clubs may undercut national rights is a major advantage, according to the WNBA’s chief 
executive.143 As a result, while some club-run league constitutions have express terms to make 
clear the reality that club owners vote the interests of their own club rather than the league as a 
whole,144 a WNBA owner who put his club’s interests ahead of the leagues in service on the 
WNBA board would arguably breach his fiduciary duty. 
Part II of this Article lays out the argument for why club-run leagues have incentives to 
perform inefficiently in the market vis-a-vis vertically separate leagues.  This section has 
suggested that, while there may be growing industry recognition of the problems with club-run 
leagues, the transactions costs involved in dividing up the proceeds of a restructuring in a manner 
satisfactory to a super-majority of club owners may be too great to permit this development.  If 
143 Id. (citing Commissioner Val Ackerman).
At the same time, several leagues that have adopted a “single entity” approach by completely 
integrating all competition organizing and club participation services (so the league owns all the 
franchises) have found the approach wanting.  See id. (indoor lacrosse league needed to modify 
single-entity to attract local investors); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 496 (Major League 
Soccer could not find investors absent ability to have local rights).
144 See, e.g., NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST., Art. II, §2.1(a) (purpose of NFL is to “foster 
the primary business of League members, each member being an owner of a professional 
football club”), excerpted in PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, STATUTORY AND 
DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT TO SPORTS AND THE LAW 42 (2d. ed. 1998).
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that is the case, legal intervention to effectuate an involuntary restructuring may be required.  
This is considered below.
D. Involuntary Restructuring Through Government Intervention
Government intervention is welfare-enhancing if it can reliably require an industry 
restructuring to eliminate collective action problems that cause inefficient and exploitive output 
reductions not likely to be subject to market correction.  This part considers two alternative bases 
for intervention.  First, applying conventional antitrust law principles in the unique context of 
sports, we justify structural antitrust relief mandating the divestiture by clubs of the competition-
organizing function of a league.  Second, we suggest that Congress may properly legislate to 
require divestiture under a clarifying amendment to the Sherman Act or via direct regulatory 
legislation, or to secure divestiture through the use of Congress’ eminent domain power by 
acquiring from the clubs the property rights necessary to create a business entity, The League, 
separate from clubs that participate in its competition.
1. Mandatory Divestiture Under Antitrust Law
Contracts in restraint of trade violate the Sherman Act.145  The Supreme Court held almost a 
century ago, however, that the broad language of the statute only precluded agreements that 
unreasonably restrained trade.146  More recently, in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. 
Board of Regents (NCAA),147 the Court provided, in the sports context, the guide to determining 
145
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, declares unlawful every “contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations.”
146
 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
147
 468 U.S. 845 (1984).
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unreasonableness.  A showing that, as a result of an agreement, prices are raised, output is 
lowered, or output is rendered unresponsive to consumer demand compared to what would 
“otherwise be” is a “hallmark” of an antitrust violation,148 even where some agreements among 
the defendant-rivals are considered necessary for the product to exist at all.149  As to the latter 
point, one of Judge Richard Posner’s most profound antitrust insights is also particularly 
relevant: "it does not follow that because two firms sometimes have a cooperative relationship 
there are no competitive gains from forbidding them to cooperate in ways that yield no 
economies but simply limit competition."150
We suggest that the relevant anticompetitive agreement is the agreement among competing 
clubs to arrogate to themselves the control of the organization of the dominant competition in 
their sport.  The economic analysis set forth in Parts II and III above demonstrates that compared 
to what would otherwise be – a sporting competition organized by a separate entity – the vertical 
integration between competition organizing and participating in the competition raises prices, 
lowers output, and renders output unresponsive to consumer demand.
As noted above, club-run leagues distort competition in a number of relevant markets.  
They are likely to set the number of teams participating in the competition at a sub-optimal level, 
fail to fully exploit the sale of broadcast or internet rights, and inefficiently market licensed 
merchandise, all of which results in reduced output that is unresponsive to demand.  Compared 
to an entity solely concerned about the interests of the league as a whole, club-run leagues are 
more likely to allocate labor resources inefficiently, tolerate operational mismanagement of 
clubs, and fail to fully exploit opportunities for international competition, all of which results in 
output being unresponsive to consumer demand.  As in the NCAA case, these are all hallmarks of 
148 Id. at 107.
149 Id. at 101.
150
 General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1984).
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antitrust violations.151  Like NCAA, the fact that these results are apparent152 suggests that leagues 
do not face reasonable substitutes and thus possess market power,153 supporting the majority of 
precedents finding that the dominant league in each sport possesses such power.154
Of course, the claims made in this Article are subject to proof in a court of law.  Because 
the relevant legal standard requires a comparison of the quantity and demand-responsiveness of 
output of the challenged agreement with what would “otherwise be,” expert testimony may well 
be required to persuade the fact-finder.  Evidence that the gains we discuss are insubstantial, or 
that club-run leagues possess efficient properties that our analysis has failed to account for,
would obviously favor a judgment for the defendant owners; evidence that the gains are 
substantial and that transactions costs explain the unwillingness of owners to voluntarily 
restructure would obviously favor the plaintiffs.
151
 468 U.S. at 107.
152
 For example, baseball fans have just witnessed the first collective bargaining agreement in 
thirty years that did not require industrial disruption to be achieved.  For a detailed chronicle of 
the difficulties in securing workable collective bargains in light of management’s obligation to 
secure agreement from owners acting in their own club’s interests, see JOHN HELYAR, LORDS OF 
THE REALM (1994).  The National Basketball Association has done nothing to restrain the 
complete mismanagement of one of their two franchises in the huge Los Angeles market.  See, 
e.g., Richard Hoffer, The Loss Generation, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (April 17, 2000), at 58 ("[The 
Clippers'] helplessness, so practiced and so dependable, is clearly the work of just one man--
we're thinking of Donald Sterling here.").  The central thesis of an excellent book on the success 
of the National Football League is that its growth was the result of Commissioner Pete Rozelle’s 
heroic efforts to persuade owners to engage in “League Think” – i.e. to put the interests of the 
league over the interests of their clubs.  See D. HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
THE NFL (1986).  Implicit in this analysis is the conclusion that, absent Rozelle’s vision and 
talent, the NFL would not efficiently act to maximize league value or consumer appeal.  If these 
leagues feared the swift retribution of the marketplace for these errors, they would not tolerate 
these inefficiencies cf. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (noting this characteristic exists where firms lack market power).
153
 468 U.S. at 111.
154
 See note 104 supra.
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In a related antitrust area – the analysis of territorial market division arrangements – the 
Supreme Court has carefully and expressly differentiated between schemes imposed by a 
vertically separate manufacturer and those agreed to by downstream competitors.  This 
distinction supports mandatory vertical separation in the sports industry.  In Sylvania,155 the Court 
recognized that vertical restraints insulating a reseller from intrabrand competition have complex 
effects, simultaneously shielding the firm from the socially beneficial constraint of rivalry from 
sellers of the same product, while creating desirable incentives for promotion, quality assurance, 
or other investment that might be otherwise subject to free riding by rivals, potentially enhancing 
the brand’s consumer appeal and thus promoting interbrand competition.  When imposed by an 
upstream seller in the independent exercise of its own business judgment, the Court concluded 
that such a seller was sufficiently likely to balance intrabrand harm and interbrand benefit to 
reach a socially-optimal result that case-by- case antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason was 
appropriate.156  In contrast, an intrabrand restraint that is the result of horizontal agreement 
among downstream rivals carries too much risk that the restraint is intended to benefit the sum of 
the rivals’ interest in reduced competition, and thus remains illegal.157  In Sealy,158 the Court 
likewise rebuffed the efforts of a joint venture that integrated the function of nationwide 
promotion of a single trademark with a market division scheme for the manufacture and sale of 
the trademarked product by separate firms, basing its decision on the critical fact that the so-
called “principal” (the corporate entity that owned the national trademark) was controlled by the 
so-called “agents” (the individual manufacturing firms).159
155
 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977).
156 Id. at 54-56.
157 Id. at 57 n.27, citing United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
158
 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
159
 The decision in Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), further supports 
the distinction between a separate entity organizing a competition and a club-run league.  The 
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Thus, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act’s condemnation of restraints of 
trade to prohibit competitors from agreeing among themselves on schemes that reduce output 
and quality for consumers.   The precedents recognize the important distinction between cartel 
behavior and that of a fully-integrated firm.  For the latter, the whole is greater than the sum of 
the parts.  As to the former, activity will only occur if supported by a super-majority of the parts.  
These precedents therefore support the conclusion that the agreement to organize a vertically 
integrated club-run league constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1.
Section 2's condemnation of monopolization also provides a basis for a judicially-ordered 
restructuring of sports leagues.  Leading antitrust precedents establish that the Sherman Act does 
not permit competitors to control a key upstream input where such control allows the 
maintenance of a monopoly and does not reflect efficiencies.  Although to date the courts have 
not required that the upstream input (in this case competition-organizing services) be provided 
by an independent firm, we believe that such a remedy is justified here by the unique features of 
sports leagues. Two of the leading cases help illustrate this point.
In Terminal Railroad,160 the Court held that the Sherman Act barred the acquisition of the 
only three means by which railroads could cross the Mississippi River at St. Louis by a 
consortium of rival railroads and the use of crossing charges to disadvantage non-owner rivals.  
Because of the significant efficiencies in joint operation of the three previously-independent 
crossing points, the Court declined to order a horizontal divestiture.  Instead, the Court required 
open access to the venture.161  Similarly, in Associated Press,162 the Court invalidated a by-law 
court refused to accept the claim that a league consisting of rival owners who simultaneously 
invested in the league and their own clubs was an entity akin to a corporation (indeed, akin to 
The League that is envisioned by this Article).  Citing Sealy, the court of appeals emphasized 
that, unlike a single entity, the league was controlled by these rivals.  Id. at 57, and n.5.
160
 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912)
161
 One possible objection to any antitrust relief when firms collectively control an input 
essential to participating in the market is that such relief may lessen incentives for investment at 
either level.  Where the remedy is designed to preclude monopoly profits that arise from a 
63
provision that allowed members to veto new members within their territories.  The veto was 
effective even if the additional members might provide stories of value to the rest of the 
membership.  This by-law demonstrated the inefficient divergence of the interests of AP 
members and the entity as a whole.163  Here, the remedy permitted presumably independent non-
rivals to determine membership decisions.164
Where a natural monopoly bottleneck exists, the ability of the bottlenecked function to be 
captured by an open-access cooperative among buyers may, in some cases,  actually have the 
potential to eliminate the distortion caused by monopoly profits.  For example, in Terminal 
Railroad, if the company that operated  the river bridges was owned by all railroads, it would 
have no incentive to charge monopoly prices to its own members.165 In these cases, vertical 
monopoly that is natural, as opposed to one resulting from “superior skill, foresight, and 
industry,” cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945), 
incentive problems should not deter antitrust relief.  Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, 
and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1005, 1033-34 (1987). In the case of 
sports leagues, incentive problems are minimized by the market power requirement to find an 
antitrust violation.  It may well be that the only firms interested in investing in a new lacrosse 
league would be those interested in operating clubs, and so a club-run league may well be 
efficient for sports that lack market power.  Once a sport obtains market power, however, there 
should be no shortage of investors for a entity capable of organizing the competition (The 
League).  The principle that restraints may be justified for new entrants but not after the firm has 
established market power has strong support in antitrust precedents.  See, e.g., Jefferson Parish 
Hospital Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 23 (1984), citing United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (tied sale to ensure new 
entrant’s reputation for quality would be maintained was reasonable, but after firm was 
established no longer necessary).   Similarly, non-competition agreements are reasonable for a 
limited time until the promisee has been able to establish itself in the marketplace.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§186-88.
162
 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
163
 Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 37-44.
164
 Given the thousands of members of the association, the risk of reciprocal rejection of new 
entrants to protect local incumbents was apparently not given serious consideration.
165
 Hovenkamp, supra note 163, at 36.
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divestiture would actually increases the potential for monopoly pricing.  A requirement that an 
independent firm contract to purchase news stories from papers around the country and resell 
them elsewhere could have a similar effect. Moreover, complete vertical integration may be 
procompetitive in markets characterized by natural monopoly at several levels.  Economic theory 
suggests that in this case of “serial monopoly,” prices can be higher and welfare reduced because 
as both monopolists seek to take monopoly profits.166 Because it is often efficient to allow a 
vertical integration between the two serial monopolists, which will result in a single monopoly 
price,167  open access regimes may not be welfare enhancing.168
Sports leagues, however, are different.  Most significantly, because there is an optimal 
number of clubs in a top-tier league,  leagues cannot really be subject to an open access regime 
contemplated by Terminal Railroad.169  Nor can leagues avoid the serial monopoly problem 
166
 Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 68 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950).
167
 David Reiffen and Andrew Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential 
Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?, 33 J. L. & ECON. 419, 424 (1990).  For a contrary 
view, see Richard D. Friedman, Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 WISC. L. REV.
873 (arguing that firms will agree on profit-maximizing output); Peter Carstensen, Khaning the 
Court: How the Antitrust Establishment Obtained an Advisory Opinion Legalizing "Maximum" 
Price Fixing, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 241, 288 (2003) (noting that because monopoly pricing takes 
place on elastic portion of demand curve, bilateral monopolists will err on the side of lower 
prices and increased output).  The latter two articles do not, however, discuss the serial 
monopoly problem in the context of joint venture of independent downstream monopolists and a 
collectively run upstream monopolist.
168
 A sports illustration cited by Reiffen and Kleit, supra note 167, at 414, is Fishman v. Wirtz, 
807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986), where they imply that the court erred in finding a Sherman Act 
violation in the refusal of the owner of Chicago Stadium, who was seeking to own the Chicago 
Bulls basketball team, to offer a stadium lease to a rival bidder.  A rival bidder would have 
sought to exploit the Bulls’ local monopoly while paying monopoly rents to the owner of the 
only suitable stadium.  On the other hand, the refusal to permit rivals to gain access to the 
stadium precludes the sort of competition for the natural monopoly that antitrust law generally 
encourages.  Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 590 n.4 
(1st Cir. 1960). Which effect predominates requires a case-by- case analysis.
169 Open Competition, supra note 9, at 649-50 and nn. 109-110.
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discussed above simply by acquiring and operating all of the teams.  Separately owned clubs 
form an important aspect of sport’s consumer appeal.170  Moreover, the entity that provides the 
competition organizing services does more than simply provide that service to clubs: because of 
the unique interdependence of sports clubs, it is actually more efficient for this entity to sell 
rights and services to consumers and licensees.171  Thus, a model where “downstream firms” 
(here the clubs) jointly operate the “upstream firm” (here the league) and then compete among 
themselves will not work in live gate, stadium, and some television and licensing markets.172
Hence, if we accept the assumption that each sport will continue to feature a single dominant 
competition,173 the monopoly power in competition organizing cannot be dissipated.  The 
inefficient and exploitive effects of club-run monopolies can, however, be mitigated.  In light of 
the demonstrated benefits of vertical separation, this novel remedy is justified in the specialized 
context of sports leagues.
Although there are strong arguments in favor of a finding that the maintenance of 
vertically-integrated, club-run leagues in the major North American sports violates the Sherman 
Act, there are significant obstacles to judicially-mandated vertical divestiture.   First, such an 
order requires a plaintiff to bear the expense and risk of a lawsuit.174  Second, although justified 
170
 The Court of Arbitration for Sport recognized this justification in upholding a challenge to a 
European soccer regulation barring clubs from participating in the European club competition if 
owned by the same entity.  AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v. Union des Associations 
Europeenes de Football, CAS 98/200 (Aug. 20, 1999) (Lausanne, Switzerland), reprinted in
XXV YEARBOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 393, 395-97 (2000).
171
 See text accompanying notes 38- 50, supra.
172
 Cf. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952) (requiring 
reasonable access to wholesale fruit facility advantageously located in railroad terminal was 
required under the assumption that rival fruit merchants would then compete with each other).
173
 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
174
 Either because of a determination that other matters have priority on government resources or 
because of political pressure, neither the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, the Federal 
Trade Commission, nor state attorneys general (under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c, 26, 
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by the unique nature of sports leagues, as noted above the relief sought is not the sort typically 
granted by antitrust courts and thus some judges may be reluctant to order an industry 
restructuring of this magnitude.  Third, in the case of Major League Baseball, either a lower 
court would have to narrowly construe the judicially- created antitrust exemption for the National 
Pastime or the Supreme Court would have to expressly apply the antitrust laws to the sport.175
Finally, the structure of a divestiture and the liability for The League and clubs may be provided 
for with greater clarity if accomplished through specific legislation.  For these reasons, Congress 
may wish to consider legislative approaches that would achieve the same welfare-enhancing 
result.
2. Mandatory Divestiture Under Congressional Regulatory Legislation
state attorneys general are authorized to enforce federal antitrust law, in federal court) may 
choose to initiate litigation.  Few private parties would have a sufficient incentive to bring their 
own claim for injunctive relief.  Sports fans are the primary victims of the inefficient conduct of 
club-run leagues catalogued above.  A private consumer class action could be brought to secure 
the mandatory divestiture discussed above, but most class actions are motivated, and the 
expenses of bringing the suit justified, by the attorney’s potential to receive fees based on a 
significant damage recovery. Although the current structure causes inefficiencies and additional 
welfare losses, proving precise damages would be difficult.  See, e.g., J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981) (proof that conduct injured competition insufficient 
to show actual damages to plaintiff).
175
 In Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), the Court held that 
baseball was not commerce subject to the Sherman Act.  Although that outmoded view of 
commerce has now been rejected, the court in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972), held 
that Congress’, “positive inaction” in refusing to overrule Federal Baseball justified its 
continued application, although it was concededly an “anomaly.”  Since Flood, several lower 
courts have found that the exemption applied narrowly only to cover the specific type of labor 
restraint at issue in that case, see Butterworth v. National League, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994) 
and Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993), or only to baseball’s 
“unique characteristics and needs,” see, e.g., Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 
541 F. Supp. 263, 268-69 (S.D. Tex. 1982), while other courts found that the exemption applied 
to the “business of baseball,” a broader concept that would appear to cover the vertical 
integration into competition organizing services.  See, e.g. Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 
F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003) Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 
2000); Minnesota Twins Partnership v. State, 592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999).
67
Congress’ plenary power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to require 
clubs in monopoly sports leagues to sell those rights that will permit an independent entity to 
more efficiently organize a sports competition.176  If Congress were persuaded by the arguments 
set forth above that club-run leagues cause significant welfare losses and consumer exploitation, 
there are at least three alternative legislative approaches to improve the quality and quantity of 
professional sports in the United States.  
First, Congress could amend the antitrust laws to specifically correct the market distortion 
caused by clubs’ insistence on maintaining control of monopoly sports leagues.  There are 
historic antecedents to this approach.  For example, Congress specifically targeted the web of 
anticompetitive lease provisions imposed by the dominant United Shoe Machinery Company on 
shoe manufacturers in crafting the Clayton Act of 1914.177  Another advantage of antitrust 
legislation is that Congress could provide additional guidance to the courts to ensure that 
procompetitive conduct envisioned by the restructuring would be lawful, and to specifically 
prohibit foreseeable anticompetitive conduct.
Second, Congress could enact special regulatory legislation prohibiting clubs from 
maintaining a voting interest in the operation of any league that does not face significant 
competition from rival leagues in the same sport.  This regulatory legislation could legalize 
conduct that was efficient and enhanced consumer appeal while specifically prohibiting 
anticompetitive conduct by The League, clubs, or rivals.  This would be analogous to the detailed 
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996178 regulating the break-up of AT&T, which 
176
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), makes clear that all 
sports, including baseball, constitute interstate commerce subject to congressional regulation.
177 See H. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
178
 Pub.L.No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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prohibited the “Baby Bells” (the local phone monopolies) from entering the market for long-
distance phone calls unless the local telephone market was open to competition.179
3. Mandatory Restructuring Under Congressional Eminent Domain Power
Finally, Congress could use its eminent domain power to purchase the bundle of rights 
necessary to organize a competition efficiently, and then resell these rights to The League.  The 
Supreme Court has clearly established that the power of eminent domain can be used not only to 
acquire property for future public ownership, but also to the mandatory purchase of property by 
the government for resale to a private party, where that sale would serve a public purpose.180  In 
authorizing the use of eminent domain to acquire land for stadium construction, courts have 
recognized that the operation of professional sports competitions for the benefit of local fans 
constitutes a public purpose.181  Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that 
correcting for the welfare reducing effects of business conduct that occurs in concentrated 
179 See 47 U.S.C. § 271.
180
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (use of eminent domain for urban renewal project).
181
 Indeed, courts have even held that the mandatory sale of a club to permit its resale to a buyer 
pledging to keep it within a particular city was a valid public use.  City of Oakland v. Oakland 
Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).  Although the city’s use of eminent domain in the context of a 
national business unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Cal. App. 
1985), this concern would not deter congressional use of eminent domain.  
The use of eminent domain to construct a major league baseball stadium was upheld in City 
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 333 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1959).  See also N. J. Sports & Exposition 
Authority v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 545, 552 (N.J. 1972) (same); Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 
215 A.2d 894 (Pa. 1966) (approving municipal loan for stadium construction as a legitimate 
public purpose).  The Supreme Court held that public uses are not limited, in the modern view, to 
matters of mere business necessity and ordinary convenience, but may extend to matters of 
public health, recreation and enjoyment.  Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
69
markets is a legitimate public purpose justifying use of the eminent domain power.182  Indeed, in 
a mixed-market economy, while the breadth of governmental power to buy and re-sell private 
property may superficially appear to be interventionist, it is preferable to a more limited view 
that, under the precedents, would permit the government to nationalize sports leagues as the only 
means to correct market failures.183
The principal economic justification for governmental purchase and resale is to overcome 
significant transaction costs that render voluntary exchange difficult.184  If our arguments above 
are persuasive, this is the precise problem here: sports leagues could be more efficiently operated 
by The League than by a club-run league, but current clubs may not voluntarily agree to an initial 
public offering or other sale because of an inability to agree among themselves on how to divide 
the proceeds.
In contrast with the traditional use of eminent domain to secure property for public 
ownership, the use of eminent domain to purchase and resell property has been criticized because 
182
 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1982) (state condemned vast estates 
owned by few huge landowners for resale to tenants, to break up real estate oligopoly); See also
Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997) (approving use of 
eminent domain to correct for other perceived failures in real estate market).  At least from 
reported cases involving challenges to exercises of eminent domain, Hawai’i appears to be the 
only jurisdiction to have used the power to correct for economic dislocations caused by 
concentrated markets.  
Although not directly on point, a leading example of the use of federal eminent domain power 
to remedy inefficiencies caused by transactions costs is described in Manufacturers Aircraft 
Ass’n v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481 (1933), which details the government’s actions just prior 
to World War I to pay royalties to the Wright Brothers and other holders of conflicting patents 
regarding aircraft construction based on a conclusion that “various companies were threatening 
all other airplane and seaplane manufacturing companies with suits for infringements of patents, 
resulting in a general demoralization of the entire trade.”  Id. at 484.
183 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 683 (2001).
184
 Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 84 (1986) (citing 
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1107-10 (1972)).
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of its potential abuse.  In a leading article,185 Professor Thomas Merrill notes three major 
objections to these sort of mandatory sales: (1) they will not fully compensate the condemnee for 
subjective losses; (2) they result in an unfair wealth transfer from the condemnee to the private 
acquirer of the surplus to be derived from the exchange; (3) they encourage potential acquirers to 
inefficiently create a scenario requiring eminent domain instead of taking efficient steps to 
secure desired property through voluntary trade.  None of these concerns are implicated in a 
forced sale of assets necessary to create a league not controlled by clubs.  
In a typical purchase-and-resell condemnation for industrial or retail development, for 
example, condemnees may be forced to give up homes or other property to which they attach 
great sentimental value, or to which they have made specific improvements appropriate for their 
needs.186  Under our proposal, club owners would suffer some subjective, uncompensated losses 
as well, but hardly ones that should attract the same amount of public concern.  After the sale, 
club owners would lose the power to make some of the important business decisions about how 
their sport’s competition is organized, and there is a risk that The League would award their local 
franchise to someone else who would be more efficient.  However, the current “power” to 
exercise significant discretion in running their ball club in the context of a league competition 
they control is primarily a result of the monopoly power that the club owners enjoy, hardly a 
power worthy of protection.  
As to the second point, it is true that an initial public offering should result in significant 
surplus resulting from the more efficient operation of a sport by The League; however, if 
organized correctly, an initial public offering should result in almost all of this surplus being 
recovered by the clubs owners.187 Indeed, to the extent that sports fans or others receive non-
185
 Merrill, supra note 184.
186 Id. at 83.
187
 An initial public offering structured in the manner outlined in Part A, supra, would be 
expected to allow existing clubs to enjoy most of the surplus created from the restructuring.
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pecuniary value from being able to “own” part of a popular sports league, the price received by 
owners may actually exceed the economic surplus resulting from the efficient restructuring of the 
competition.188
The third concern may be expressed in two alternative ways: the private acquirer may have 
acted or failed to act in a way to create the transaction cost problem189 or other government 
policies may have created the significant public need for condemnation.  As to the latter, the best 
known example is the controversial use by Detroit of eminent domain power to destroy a 
working-class neighborhood to create land for a new General Motors factory, necessitated by 
General Motors’ threat to relocate the factory to another state offering generous tax subsidies.190
Detroit would not have used eminent domain if Congress, in the exercise of its authority to 
regulate interstate commerce, had adopted the approach of the European Union and prohibited 
states and local subsidies for the relocation of firms.191  While Detroit used eminent domain as 
part of a “bidding” process that allowed firms with power to credibly threaten relocation to 
exploit cities and their taxpayers, in the sports scenario eminent domain is being used to promote 
efficiency and reduce consumer exploitation.  Thus, eminent domain should be considered a 
viable and non-problematic option for implementing our proposal.
* * *
188 See Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.32d 1091, 1100 (1st Cir. 1994) (Professor 
Roger Noll testified that fans’ demand for sports stock increases value).  Thanks to Professor 
Gary Roberts for this insight.
189
 Merrill’s illustration is the deliberate construction of a structure on a neighbor’s land.  
Merrill, supra note 184, at 88.
190 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
191 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, arts. 87-89 (ex arts. 92-94), Nov. 10, 
1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173.
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An inherent conflict exists when clubs participating in a sports league competition control 
the way in which the competition is organized.  This conflict distorts the manner in which the 
league determines the number and location of franchises, how broadcast rights are sold, how 
merchandise, licensing, and sponsorships are marketed, how club executives are supervised, how 
player talent is distributed among clubs, and how domestic and international competitions 
coincide.  In each of these instances, any particular decision may make some clubs better off and 
some worse off, and transaction costs often prevent the most efficient result from being selected.  
Both profits and consumer welfare would increase if these decisions were made instead by a 
competition organizer independent of the clubs.  Although owners and outside investors could 
capitalize the increased profitability of a vertically-separate league by voluntarily restructuring 
professional sports, the same transaction cost problem could prevent current owners from 
agreeing on how to divide the proceeds from such a restructuring, resulting in an inefficient 
status quo.  To the extent that league owners refuse to voluntarily restructure the industry, we 
believe that a plaintiff could establish in antitrust litigation that the continuing agreement by 
clubs to run their own competition constitutes both an illegal restraint of trade and 
monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act.  Failing litigation, Congress could amend the 
antitrust laws, enact specific regulatory legislation, or use its power of eminent domain to acquire
the rights necessary for the creation of The League as an entity organizing a sporting competition 
that is separate from the owners. 
